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Abstract  
This study analyzes the patterns of agglomeration of some modern manufacturing sectors in 
India, and in particular the Indian automobile sector. It also examines and contrasts the factors 
that have led to different patterns of cluster development in two leading auto clusters in 
India—Chennai and the National Capital Region (NCR). Moreover, the study analyzes whether 
firms in clusters perform better than those that are excluded and whether the relative 
importance of variables that determine the behavior of firms differs among clusters. Our 
analyses, which employ a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, show that Indian 
industrial clusters are largely concentrated in the three clustered regions: NCR, Mumbai-Pune,
and Chennai-Bangalore, across different manufacturing sectors. Our study of the auto clusters in Chennai 
and the NCR find considerable differences in the patterns of cluster formation, due partly to the historical 
and policy conditions under which firms, particularly, the lead firms must operate. Moreover, our
econometric analyses confirmed that being part of a cluster positively influences the performance of the 
auto component firms and those belonging to a cluster perform better. 
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Industrial Clusters in India:  Evidence from Automobile Clusters in  
Chennai and the National Capital Region1 
 
 
Aya Okada, and N. S. Siddharthan 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Empirical studies on agglomeration economies have primarily focused on the nature and 
sources of agglomeration, its impact on the performance of firms and industries, and 
mechanisms that connect agglomeration to innovation and regional growth (Saxenian 
1994; Breschi and Lissoni 2001; Rosenthal and Strange 2004).  With regard to the 
sources of agglomeration economies, the classical literature, in particular Marshall’s 
(1920) seminal work, discussed highly localized industries and their contribution to 
continued growth of the town and the industry (1920:271), identifying three key factors 
– increasing returns to scale, labor market pooling and knowledge spillovers.  More 
recent works, particularly recent theoretical advancements in economic geography, have 
expanded and built on Marshall’s classic arguments (Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 
1999; Rosenthal and Strange 2004).  Some scholars have identified other relatively 
immobile resources, such as knowledge, skills, local institutions, industrial and 
corporate structures and networks, as important determinants of growth enhancing 
                                                 
1 [1] This study was undertaken when Siddharthan was a Professor at the Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi. We 
are grateful to the Institute of Economic Growth for their academic and administrative support and to the Institute of 
Developing Economies, Japan, for their generous financial support. We thank Mr. G. Lakshmana Rao for his able 
research assistance.  
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effects of agglomeration (Saxenian 1994; Breschi and Malerba 2001; Karlsson, 
Johansson and Stough 2005).    
 Some recent works, that support localization economies rather than 
urbanization economies, however, suggest a variation across industries in agglomeration 
effects (Henderson 1986, 2003; Nakamura 1985; Rosenthal and Strange 2003).  Others 
stressed the important role of foreign direct investment (FDI) as a determinant of the 
patterns of agglomeration particularly in the context of developing countries (He Canfei 
2002).  However, empirical literature on agglomeration and clusters in developing 
countries is still limited, despite the growing recognition of the importance of these for 
their regional and national economic development.  Especially, the literature on the 
causes of variations of the patterns of cluster formation and development across and 
within industries is very few.  As for India, apart from a few case studies, virtually no 
systematic studies exist on the spatial dimension of its industrial development, despite 
recent growing interest in India’s growth prospect among scholars and policymakers 
inside and outside the country.   
 Therefore, the objectives of this chapter are threefold.  First, we analyze the 
patterns of agglomeration of some modern manufacturing sectors in India, and in 
particular the Indian automobile (including the automotive components) sector.  
Second, we examine and contrast the factors that have led to different patterns of cluster 
development in two leading auto clusters in India—Chennai in the state of Tamil Nadu, 
and the National Capital Region (NCR).2  Finally, we analyze whether firms in clusters 
                                                 
2 The National Capital Region (NCR) refers to a region in and surrounding the national capital, Delhi. This includes 
some districts in the state of Haryana (such as Gurgaon and Faridabad), and some districts in Uttar Pradesh (such as 
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perform better than those that are excluded and whether the relative importance of 
variables that determine the behavior of firms differs among clusters.   
 This study focuses on these two auto clusters in India for several reasons. First, 
the automobile industry, because of its large backward linkages, greatly influences the 
pattern of economic development in almost every country and every region that 
produces cars.  Second, the automobile sector has grown remarkably since the 1980s, 
to become one of India’s leading manufacturing industries (Okada 2000).  Third, these 
two auto clusters, while operating in the same industry in the same country, exhibit very 
different patterns of agglomeration, and thus allow us to examine and contrast the 
factors that have led these clusters to grow differently.   
 This study employs a combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses.  
For the former, we present aggregate analyses to identify the patterns of spatial 
distribution of selected modern manufacturing industries, and econometric analyses to 
examine the differential patterns of behavior between clustered and non-clustered firms, 
using the data set available from the Capital Line database.3  Our sample consists of all 
the automobile component manufacturing firms listed in the Capital Line data set, 
covering the period from 1998 – 2005.   
 In addition, we present qualitative analyses drawing on extensive interviews we 
conducted with both assemblers and component suppliers in the Indian automobile 
industry as well as with representatives from the government agencies, industrial 
                                                                                                                                               
Noida and Ghaziabad) adjacent to Delhi. 
3 This is one of the most widely-used databases in India, available “on line” as well as in CD on subscription, which. 
provides data for about 8000 firms registered in India, including multinationals registered in the Indian Stock 
Exchanges.   
 4
associations such as the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII), the Society of Indian 
Automobile Manufacutrers (SIAM), and the Automotive Component Manufacturers 
Associations (ACMA).    
 This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the literature on clusters, 
knowledge spillovers, and FDI to position this study in the light of the literature.  
Section 3 examines the patterns of industrial agglomerations of selected modern 
manufacturing industries in India, measured by value added and employment.  It also 
briefly identifies leading firms in major clusters of different industries and considers 
their roles.  Section 4 presents the geographical distribution of FDI in India, and 
compares this with the patterns of industrial agglomeration identified in Section 3.  
Section 5 analyzes the factors that have influenced the formation and growth of 
automobile clusters in Chennai and the NCR.  Section 6 presents an econometric 
analysis of the differences in the conduct and performance of firms in the three main 
auto clusters in India, namely, in Chennai, the NCR, and the Mumbai-Pune belt (in the 
state of Maharashtra), and firms that are outside the three clusters.  Section 8 
summarizes the findings and brings out the main lessons from the study. 
 
2. Factors Contributing to the Growth of Clusters   
Various scholars, particularly endogenous growth theorists, have focused on the role of 
knowledge spillovers and their role in generating increasing returns (Romer 1986; 
Krugman 1991; Grossman and Helpman 1991).  Furthermore, there is evidence that 
R&D spillovers are influenced by physical distance from the knowledge source (Acs et 
al. 1994; Feldman 1994).  In this context, the study by Audretsch and Feldman (1996) 
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shows that even after controlling for the degree of geographic concentration in production, 
there is a clustering of innovative activities in industries where knowledge spillovers play a 
decisive role.  Other recent studies have emphasized the role of universities and education 
institutions and public laboratories in encouraging cluster formation (Zucker et al. 1998; 
Cooke 2001; Breschi and Malerba 2001; Audretsch and Lehmann 2005).  Similarly, other 
studies emphasize the role of region specific characteristics in explaining regional 
innovative activity and in particular the role of networking within the region in enhancing 
innovation (Ronde and Hussler 2005).  Their empirical results suggest that a high level of 
qualified and skilled labor force and the presence of good universities is a necessary 
condition for regional innovation. Likewise, the study by Asheim and Coenen (2005) on 
Nordic clusters also emphasizes the key role played by the supply of a highly skilled labor 
force and access to scientific excellence.  They make a distinction between clusters and 
regional information systems, which though strongly interrelated are yet different 
concepts.   
The literature on FDI inflows favoring industrial clusters is rich.  Statistical 
results from several studies focusing on developing economies strongly buttress the 
argument that foreign investors are inclined to favor such locations that could minimize 
information costs and offer a variety of agglomeration economies (He Canfei 2002). 
Belderbos and Carree (2002) analyze the location choices by Japanese electronics 
manufacturers in China's regions and provinces during 1990-1995 and confirm the 
major impact of regions in promoting industry, and Japanese keiretsu-specific 
agglomeration benefits.  Export-oriented plants are more responsive than 
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local-market-oriented plants to Japanese-type (keiretsu) agglomeration and the presence 
of seaports, but appear less responsive to regional demand and region-specific 
incentives.  Tuan and Linda (2003) find that with given distance from the core, firms 
prefer sites with higher firm agglomeration.  It may also influence the sectoral pattern 
of FDI across countries or inter-country distribution of a particular sector’s FDI flows 
(Eaton, Lipsey and Safarian 1994).  
Wei (1999) analyzes the determinants of the regional distribution of FDI within 
China and finds that there exists a long-term relationship between the spatial 
distribution of FDI and a number of regional characteristics.  Provinces with a higher 
level of international trade, lower wage rates, more R&D manpower, higher GDP 
growth rates, quicker improvement in infrastructure, more rapid advances in 
agglomeration, more preferential policies and closer ethnic links with overseas Chinese 
attract relatively more FDI.  Similarly, Jianping (1999) examines the agglomeration 
effects of the location of U.S. and Japanese manufacturing firms within China's 30 
administrative regions during the period 1981-1996.  The empirical results indicate 
that agglomeration effects exist in both countries' site choices, though they are varied in 
degree by sectors owing to firms' nature and country's preference.  
Likewise for Indonesia, Syamwil et al. (2000) analyze regional changes in the 
spatial pattern of Japanese manufacturing industries and the effect of deregulation of 
foreign investment during 1984-94.  They use the data of 560 Japanese manufacturing 
industries in Indonesia.  The result of this study indicates continuous regional 
concentration in the core region of Java and that markets, agglomeration and 
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infrastructure continue to be the main reasons for the location of Japanese 
manufacturing industries in the region.  
Evidence from developed economies also display the favoring of strong linkages 
between FDI and agglomeration (Ford and Strange 1999). Agglomeration economies, 
local industry output, educational attainment and English language ability have 
significantly positive effects on the location decision of firms investing abroad, whereas 
wage levels, unionization, and local industry productivity all had significantly negative 
effects. 
Head et al. (1995) argue that firms in the same industry may be drawn to the 
same locations because proximity generates positive externalities or 'agglomeration 
effects,' and that chance events and government inducements can have a lasting 
influence on the geographical pattern of manufacturing. Their study examines the 
location choices of 751 Japanese manufacturing plants built in the United States since 
1980 and its findings indicate that industry-level agglomeration benefits play an 
important role in location decisions.  In yet another study Head and Ries (1996) find 
that `attractive' cities, i.e., those with good infrastructure and an established industrial 
base, gained most and that agglomeration effects greatly magnified the direct impact of 
policy.  Kuchiki (2004) in what he calls “a flowchart model” identifies the role of 
policy interventions (such as the creation of industrial zones and export processing 
zones); local capacity building (infrastructure, institutions, and human resource 
development); and lead firms, as important factors for developing industrial clusters.   
Some recent studies have stressed the importance of intra-industry linkages.  
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For example, Braunerhjelm and Swenson (1996) find the overseas operation of Swedish 
firms to be positively affected by the host countries’ large production in the industry of 
the investing firm.  The effect of agglomeration was strongest in the technologically 
more advanced industries. Other studies have emphasized the role of the existing 
Japanese firms in attracting other Japanese firms to the same location (Head et al. 1995). 
 The studies surveyed in this section suggest that an interaction of various 
factors—including idiosyncratic local characteristics and historical events, contribute to 
the formation and development of industrial clusters.   
 
3. Regional Agglomeration of Selected Modern Industries:  
Consumer Electronics, Electronics Components and Computer Hardware, 
and Drugs and Pharmaceuticals 
 
This section briefly maps out the pattern of spatial distribution and concentration of 
selected modern manufacturing industries in India which include the following: 
consumer electronics; electronics and computer hardware; and drugs and 
pharmaceuticals.  Due to some technical difficulties in mapping out the city-level plant 
location of the firms in these industries, we present a state-wise pattern of geographical 
concentration of these industries.  As many firms have plants in and nearby the state 
capital, these patterns can be however, interpreted as an approximate proxy for 
industrial clusters emerging in and around the state capital. 
 
3.1 Consumer Electronics 
 Consumer electronics comprise of audio products, television sets, video 
recording and an assortment of products like electronic watches, and video games.  
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This is a newly emerging industry in India and the lead firms include some of the 
well-known multinationals.   
 Table 1 presents the share of different States in the value addition and 
employment of the three manufacturing sectors – consumer electronics, electronics and 
computer hardware, and drugs and pharmaceuticals.  The table presents data for 33 
Indian states and Union territories, classified into four regions – north, east, west and 
south.4   
                                                 
4  The northern States includes Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Chandigarh (Union Territory), 
Uttranchal, NCR, Rajastan, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh.  Of these, Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh and 
Uttranchal are hill states where large factories cannot be located. The eastern States include Nagaland, Manipur, 
Meghalaya, Assam, Tripura, Arunachal, Mizoram, Sikkim, West Bengal, Jharkhand, Orissa and Chattisgharh. Of 
these, Nagaland, Manipur, Meghalaya, Tripura, Arunachal, Mizoram and Sikkim are dominated by hill regions where 
it is difficult to establish large factories.  Jarkhand was earlier part of Bihar and Chattisgharg was part of Madhya 
Pradesh.  The western States include Gujarat, Daman and Diu, Dardra and Maharastra.  Of these only Gujarat and 
Maharastra are large states.  The southern States include Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Goa, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and 
Pondichery (Union Territory). The list does not include the Andaiman and Nicobar islands as they have no industrial 
unit. 
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Table 1: Spatial Distribution of Selected Modern Manufacutring Industries : 
Value Added and Employment 
 
State Drugs 
(%)  
Electronics 
(%) 
Consumer 
Electronics 
(%) 
Drugs 
(%) 
Electronics 
(%) 
Consumer 
Electronics 
(%)      
 VA VA VA Emp Emp Emp 
North       
J&K 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.30 0.30 
HP 2.28 0.21 0 0.49 1.91 0.58 
Punjab 2.63 0.54 0.67 1.68 4.95 1.08 
Chandigarh 0.04 0.15 0.12 0.04 0.37 0.16 
Uttranchal 0.39 1.01 0.55 0.32 0.94 1.11 
NCR 3.04 21.76 31.64 4.0 17.31 26.24 
Rajastan 0.89 4.27 2.23 1.31 1.31 2.71 
UP-Rest 3.79 - - 4.52 - - 
Bihar 0.07 0 0 0.24 0 0 
MP 4.14 0.96 3.35 3.11 0.81 2.48 
East       
Nagaland 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Manipur 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Meghalaya 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Assam 0.25 0 0 0.28 0 0 
Tripura 0.002 0 0 0.01 0 0 
Arunachal 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mizoram 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sikkim 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W.Bengal 3.69 1.44 3.55 4.60 2.80 4.54 
Jharkhand 0.42 0 0.83 0.53 0 0.71 
Orissa 0.09 0 0.12 0.44 0 0.33 
Chattisgarh 0.05 0 2.17 0.26 0 1.71 
West       
Gujarat 15.13 12.17 4.84 15.43 6.49 8.88 
Daman&Diu 3.04 0.07 3.01 1.32 0.14 3.50 
Dardra 4.06 1.97 0 1.34 0.48 0 
Maharashtra 25.92 9.30 26.98 16.47 15.38 27.14 
South       
AP 9.86 8.88 1.70 9.04 10.10 2.57 
Karnataka 4.25 15.46 9.67 4.89 20.04 6.44 
Goa 4.29 2.24 0.15 1.36 1.42 0.30 
Kerala 1.61 5.30 1.08 1.78 4.83 1.97 
Tamil Nadu 6.25 2.47 5.87 25.49 6.07 6.20 
Pondichery 3.74 6.63 0 1.10 0.63 0 
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 Source: Calculated from Annual Survey of Industries, Government of India. 
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   Map 1: Consumer Electronics Industry: Spatial Distribution of Value Added 
by State  
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Map 2:Consumer Electronics: Spatial Distribution of Employment by State 
 
 
 
 14
 As Table 1 and Maps 1 and 2 show, this industry is concentrated in three major 
states: NCR with 32 percent of the output share; Maharashtra with 27 percent of the 
output share; Karnataka with about 10 percent, and Tamil Nadu with six percent, as 
measured in valued added.  The rest of India had an insignificant presence. 
 The key players in this industry include: 
 
• Philips Electronics, established in 1930 with units mainly in Maharashtra, 
Gujarat and West Bengal with a current sales turnover of Rs. 230 billion; 
Philips is one of the oldest establishments in India and produces consumer 
electronics and electronics hardware, manufacturing consumer electronic 
products at its plants in Pimpri (in the city of Pune, Maharashtra) and Kolkatta 
(West Bengal).  Nevertheless, it has not acted as a lead firm in developing a 
cluster in consumer electronics in these regions. 
 
• BPL, established in 1963 with factories mainly in Bangalore.  It also has 
units in Kerala and the NCR, yielding a current sales turnover of Rs. 102 
billion. 
BPL manufactures such products as televisions, test and measuring equipments, 
medical electronic equipments and office automation products.  The technical 
tie-up with Sanyo, Japan, has helped the company widen its product range 
making it a formidable player in the Indian electronic industry.  It has played a 
notable role in developing the Bangalore cluster. 
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• Videocon International (VIL), established in 1985 with factories mainly in 
Maharashtra, Gujarat, the NCR and Karnataka, with a current sales turnover 
of Rs. 400 billion. 
VIL manufactures televisions, washing machines, refrigerators, air conditioners, 
air coolers, VCRs, VCPs and audio systems.  It also has launched a complete 
range of kitchen appliances.  The firm has technical collaboration with the 
Japanese giants - Mitsubishi, Toshiba, and Matsushita, and has overseas 
production centers in Dubai, Thailand and South Africa.  
 
• Samsung India Electronics, established in 1995 with plants in the NCR and 
with a sales turnover of Rs. 317 billion. 
 
 
 16
3.2 Electronics and Computer Hardware 
 
 India entered this sector in the late 1940s by establishing a production base for 
radio receivers with foreign collaboration.  During the 1940s and the 1950s 
distinctions were not made between consumer electronics and other electronic hardware.  
In the mid-1960s, electronic production was initiated mainly in the defense sector as an 
import substitution measure.  Under electronics and computer hardware, we cover 
industrial electronics, computers and office automation.   
As seen from Table 1 and Maps 3 and 4, in the electronics and computer 
hardware sector, three states dominate: the NCR with an output share of about 22 
percent, Karnataka with about 15 percent and Gujarat with about 12 percent.  In this 
industry also the share of the South Indian States is very high, at about 40 percent.  In 
this sector, many of the earlier firms started with a different product mix producing 
mainly electrical goods and have switched over to electronics and computer hardware in 
recent years.  
  
 The lead firms in this industry include:  
 
• Philips Electronics, established in 1930, with plants mainly in Maharashtra, 
Gujarat and West Bengal with a current sales turnover of Rs. 230 billion; 
Philips Electronics is a multi-product and multi-plant firm, producing consumer 
electronics and electronics hardware.  It is a leading firm in both the segments.  
Philips India was incorporated in 1930 as a private limited company under the 
name Philips Electrical Company (India), as a subsidiary of Philips, the 
Netherlands.  It acquired its present name in 1956, after privatization and was 
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converted into a public limited company in 1957. Initially, the company 
commenced by trading in radios and subsequently, set up plants to manufacture 
consumer electronics, electronic components, industrial electronics and lighting.  
The firm is also into office automation products.  It produces electronic 
components, passive devices and printed circuit boards in its plant in Pune 
(Maharashtra).  It has also established a large R&D center in Bangalore that 
serves the global interests of Philips.  
 
• ITI Limited, established in 1950 with plants mainly in Karnataka and the  
NCR, with a current sales turnover of Rs. 105 billion. 
ITI Ltd (formerly Indian Telephone Industries) was a state-owned enterprise.  
However, the government diluted its share through disinvestments in favor of 
financial institutions, banks and mutual funds.  It played a crucial role in 
developing the IT industry in Bangalore by developing ancillaries and training 
skilled workforce.  It produces telecom products like electronic switching 
equipment, digital radio, telephone instruments, optical fibre equipment, open 
wire bags, and digital exchanges. It has technical tie-ups with Alcatel, France, 
and NKT, Denmark, for switching equipment and optical link technical 
equipment, with NEC, Japan for digital microwave equipment. Its lead role in 
developing the Bangalore IT cluster has been well recognized. 
 
• Moser Baer Ltd, established in 1983 with plants mainly in the NCR with a 
current sales turnover of Rs. 135 billion. 
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Moser Baer Ltd. manufactures storage media for data applications and 
audio/video applications. It is a leading exporter of 5.25 floppy diskettes and 
CD-Rs.  It has also entered into an agreement with German firms Mag Media, 
IMTC and RES, all of Germany, on a world-wide basis for the supply of its 
entire production of 3.5" MFD of 1-MB and 2-MB capacity.  The firms R&D 
focuses on developing newer, faster and more reliable CD-R products, 
improving the existing CD-R process to reduce manufacturing cost and 
developing new high density storage formats for both digital versatile 
CD(DVD-R) and higher density DVD formats.  It has all its plants (seven) in 
Noida (NCR).  It has played a leading role in developing the NCR cluster – the 
most important cluster for this industry. 
 
 
• HCL Infosystems Limited, established in 1986, with plants mainly in Tamil 
Nadu and Pondichery with a sales turnover of Rs. 142 billion. 
HCL Infosystems Ltd. (formerly HCL Hewlett-Packard) was promoted by a 
group of technocrats. In May 1986, the company took over Hindustan 
Computers, Hindustan Reprographics, Hindustan Instruments and Indian 
Computer Software Co.  In 1991, the firm entered into a joint venture with 
Hewlett-Packard Co, US, for combining the computer manufacturing, marketing 
and servicing activities of the company and Hewlett Packard India Pvt. Ltd.  
The company manufactures computer systems at Noida (in NCR) and computer 
peripherals at Chennai.  It also manufactures multi-user super-minis and 
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engineering workstations, using the technology provided by Hewlett-Packard. 
The firm has also played a notable role in developing the NCR cluster. 
 
• Himachal Futuristic Communications, established in 1987 with plants mainly 
in Himachal Pradesh and NCR with a turnover of Rs. 100 billion. 
Himachal Futuristic Communications, established as a public sector company 
and promoted by the Himachal Pradesh State Electronics Development 
Corporation. It was privatized in 1988.  Commercial production commenced in 
1989.  It first manufactured subscriber line multiplexers (subscriber carrier 
systems) at Solan, Himachal Pradesh. It has also set up an optical fibre cable 
plant at Goa.  Himachal Futuristic Communications has three ISO 9002 
approved manufacturing plants located at Solan and Goa.  It has currently nine 
product lines namely, analogue subscriber carrier system; 30 and 120 channel 
PCM multiplexers; 2 GHz digital microwave radios; optical line transmission 
equipment (PDH); coils and transformers; 10 channel digital UHF radios; high 
order multiplexers; line concentrators; and optical fibre cable.  
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Map 3: Electronics and Computer Hardware Industry: Spatial Distribution of Value 
Added by State 
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Map 4: Electronics and Computer Hardware: Spatial Distribution of Employment 
by State 
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3.3  Drugs and Pharmaceuticals 
 
 Among the developing countries, India has been recognized by UNIDO as one 
of the top ranking countries in terms of production and distribution of pharmaceuticals.  
Till recently, India allowed only process patenting and did not permit product patenting.  
By now, however, the Indian intellectual property protection laws are compatible with 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) regime, making the Indian pharmaceutical 
industry stand for global competition.  The industry is very competitive, and some 
Indian firms have become global players in terms of exports and acquisition of 
European and U.S. pharmaceutical companies.  
 23
 Map 5: Pharmaceutical Industry: Spatial Distribution of Value Added by State 
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Map 6: Pharmaceutical Industry: Spatial Distribution of Employment by 
State 
 
 
 25
 
As Table 1 shows, a few Indian States account for the major bulk of 
pharmaceutical output in India. The pharmaceutical firms are mainly located in the 
West and Southern States such as Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, and Andhra 
Pradesh.  Map 5 presents the share in value added, and shows Maharashtra and Gujarat 
dominating with more than a 20 and 15 per cent share while Tamil Nadu and Andhra 
Pradesh come next.  However, in terms of employment, Tamil Nadu dominates, while 
Maharashtra and Gujarat follow thereafter (see Map 6).  This implies that the plants 
located in Maharashtra and Gujarat are generally more capital intensive, while firms in 
Tamil Nadu are more labor intensive. 
 The two adjacent states of Maharashtra and Gujarat were part of a single State 
(the Bombay Province) until the 1950s before the States were reorganized. Major 
pharmaceutical firms came to Bombay even before India’s independence in 1946. 
 Among others the current leading pharmaceutical firms include the following:  
 
• Glaxo, established in 1924 with a current sales turnover of Rs.148 billion. 
Most of its plants continue to be in Maharashtra though it has recently started 
some plants in Karnataka. 
Glaxo is one of the earliest pharmaceutical firms in India. Glaxo India started as 
an agency house to distribute the well-known Glaxo baby food, to become a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Joseph Nathan and Co, UK.  In 1947, the firm was 
renamed as Glaxo Laboratories (India). Glaxo India is now an affiliate of Glaxo 
Smith Kline plc, which holds 51% of the equity.  Glaxo has a strong product 
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line with quite a few brands in the country’s top 250 brands. Among its principal 
products are Betamethasone- based topical steroids, Betnovate-C, Betnovate-M, 
and Betnovate- GM.  Glaxo has also been encouraging the development of 
several small and medium enterprises to supply it with chemicals and other 
materials. 
 
• Cipla Limited, established in 1935, has a current sales turnover of about 
Rs.233 billion, and its plants are mainly in Maharashtra. 
In recent years Cipla Limited has attracted international attention as it sells 
drugs for AIDs, anti-bacterials, anti-asthmatics, anti-inflammatory anthelminites, 
anti-cancer and cardiovasculars at a fraction of an international price.  
Furthermore, it was in the international news during the anthrax scare as it was 
in a position to supply anti-anthrax drugs in sufficient quantities at a fraction of 
the price charged by the US firms. To position itself in the global market it made 
sure that all its bulk drug facilities in India (mainly the Maharashtra) have been 
approved by the US FDA and the formulation facilities have been approved by 
the Medicine Control Agency, UK; the Medicine Control Council, South Africa; 
the Therapeutic Goods Administration, Australia and other international 
agencies. This is a special case of an Indian firm emerging into a global player 
with plants located mainly in India and in particular, in the state of Maharastra.  
 
• Nicholas Piramal Limited, established in 1947, and its plants mainly in 
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Maharashtra and Gujarat were largely responsible for the development of the 
Maharashtra-Gujarat cluster.  In recent years it established plants in Tamil 
Nadu and Andhra Pradesh also.  Its current sales turnover is Rs.138 billion. 
The firm was incorporated in 1947 as Indian Schering as a subsidiary of the 
British Schering, UK. However, the management of the company was acquired 
by Piramal Enterprises in 1988. It is a major player in formulations, diagnostics 
and vitamins in the Indian pharmaceutical industry, besides having good export 
presence. The firm has a portfolio of around 160 brands, with accreditations and 
approvals from USFDA, MCA of UK,TGA of Australia, European Drug 
Authorities and Canadian Drug Authorities.  
 
• Ranbaxy Laboratories, established in 1961, with factories mainly in Punjab 
and the NCR. Its sales turnover is Rs.368 billion. 
Ranbaxy is a Delhi-based firm that has plants mainly in Punjab and the NCR. 
However, in developing a large cluster in and around Delhi its role is limited 
when, compared to Dr. Reddy’s in Andhra Pradesh.  As a private limited 
company, the firm is the largest exporter of bulk drugs and pharmaceutical 
dosage forms in India, and has three successful overseas joint ventures in 
Nigeria, Malaysia and Thailand, and the US. A joint venture incorporated in 
India with Eli Lilly - a leading original research company in pharmaceuticals has 
began its operations. Its bulk antibiotics plant at Toansa, Punjab, has been 
approved by the US FDA and the dosage forms pharmaceuticals plant at Dewas, 
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MP, is accredited by the World Health Organization (WHO).  It has three 
plants in Punjab and one each in Himachal Pradesh, Delhi, Goa, Madhya 
Pradesh, and Maharashtra.  Despite the presence of a large firm like Ranbaxy, 
the share of North India and the NCR in the output of the industry has not 
increased significantly. 
 
• Dr. Reddys Laboratories, established in 1984 in Andhra Pradesh. Most of its 
plants are in Andhra Pradesh, but it also has plants in London, Yorkshire, 
Goa and Pondichery.  Its current sales turnover is Rs.163 billion. 
Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories has emerged as a leading Indian pharmaceutical 
company with vertically integrated operations.  The firm develops, 
manufactures and markets a wide range of pharmaceutical products in India and 
in export markets such as the UK, Switzerland, Germany, Spain, Italy and the 
Netherlands, with over 190 finished dosage brands and 60 active pharmaceutical 
ingredients currently in production.  Unlike other Maharashtra-based leading 
firms, Dr. Reddy’s is a R&D intensive firm and actively pursues a basic research 
program under the aegis of Dr. Reddy’s Research Foundation (DRF). DRL has 
signed a joint venture agreement with the Khetan group, Nepal, for setting up a 
joint venture for the manufacture and marketing of finished formulations in 
Nepal and other neighboring countries. It also signed a marketing and 
distribution agreement with Organics, Israel, for a wide range of sophisticated 
diagnostic kits. The products are recognized by WHO and other leading 
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organizations in the healthcare industry. Since 2001, its equities are traded in the 
New York Stock Exchange. The firm has about 23 plants and except for four 
plants (two of them are in the UK), the rest are located in Andhra Pradesh. It is 
certainly the lead firm responsible for the Andhra Pradesh cluster. 
 
 The pharmaceutical industry came into existence in the pre-independence era 
(1920s and 1930s) and was mainly located in the Bombay province of the British India 
which has now been divided into two main States, the States of Maharashtra and 
Gujarat. Some of the lead firms that dominated in that era continue to dominate even 
now and the current share of Maharashtra and Gujarat in the industry output is as high 
as 41 percent.  However since the 1980s, several new firms have emerged in other 
regions such as the NCR, Andhra Pradesh and other South Indian states.  Unlike the 
traditional lead firms, these new firms have no MNE participation or FDI inflows; 
instead, they are emerging as Indian MNEs while investing in Europe and the U.S.  
They are knowledge-intensive and R&D driven, have introduced new products and 
processes, and have penetrated the European and the U.S. markets. Currently, the share 
of South India in the pharmaceutical value added is about 30 percent, and Andhra 
Pradesh alone accounts for about 10 percent.  These new firms are mainly responsible 
for the clusters in the NCR and Andhra Pradesh. 
 An analysis of the patterns of spatial distribution of the three modern 
manufacturing industries as reviewed in this section reveals several notable trends:  
First, Indian manufacturing activities across sectors are geographically concentrated in 
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several states in terms of both value added and employment.  The locations of these are 
the NCR (i.e., Delhi and Haryana), Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka.  
In the case of pharmaceuticals, Andhra Pradesh is also important.  Second, the sectoral 
differences in the patterns of regional concentration are very small among the three 
modern industries.  Third, differences between output and employment in terms of the 
patterns of spatial distribution are also small.  Fourth, in all the three industries, most 
lead firms have continued to be dominant since the pre-Independence era, except the 
newly-emerging pharmaceutical firms are dominant by being more knowledge intensive 
and R&D driven.  Finally, most lead firms in these industries have had significant FDI 
involvement even in the pre-licensing era, again except the newly emerging 
pharmaceutical firms that do not depend on FDI; to the contrary, they are themselves 
MNCs.   
 
3.4  Geographical Distribution of Investment in Industries and Socioeconomic 
Infrastructure  
 
 The States where these three industries are agglomerated also receive most 
investments for all the industries.  As the exact State-wise data on private sector 
aggregate investment for the decade 1991-1999 is not available, we present the data on 
the letter of intent granted by the Central government as a proxy for the level of 
investment in each state, as summarized in Table 2.  
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Table 2: Industrial Investment Proposals (State-wise) 
(Letters of intent issued) 
August 1991 to October 1999. 
 
State Investment 
(Rs.10mill) 
Percentage 
Gujarat 20090 19.23 
Maharashtra 12176 11.65 
Tamil Nadu 10479 10.03 
Andhra 10076   9.74 
Uttar Pradesh  9894   9.47 
Karnataka  9261   8.86 
Orissa  5443   5.21 
Punjab  4995   4.30 
Haryana  4093   3.92 
West Bengal  3956   3.79 
Madhya Pradesh  3628   3.47 
Kerala  2513   2.41 
Assam  2530   2.33 
Bihar  1806   1.73 
Rajastan  1608   1.54 
Source: Ministry of Industrial Development.  
Note: The States that receive less than 1% are omitted from the table. 
 
 In Table 2, investments in Uttar Pradesh and Haryana mainly refer to the NCR. 
Uttar Pradesh receives very little investment outside the NCR. Thus, the States that 
dominated domestic private investments are Gujarat (mostly in petrochemicals and 
pharmaceuticals), Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, NCR, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. 
Interestingly, the very same states that dominated in the value addition in the three 
industries discussed earlier, receive the most domestic investment.  Within these States, 
industrial investment and production activities are concentrated in specific clusters, as in 
the Mumbai – Pune belt in Maharashtra, and the Chennai – Bangalore (including Hosur) 
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belt in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka.5  Thus, Indian industrial clusters are largely 
concentrated in the three clustered regions: NCR, Mumbai-Pune, and 
Chennai-Bangalore (see Map 7).   
 As Table 3 shows, the six main States with high industrial agglomeration have 
also been ranked high in terms of the state-wise human development index (HDI) and 
the index of social and economic infrastructure, both prepared by the Indian 
Government.  For example, States like Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Haryana 
and Karnataka enjoy high ranks in both the HDI and the socio economic index.  In the 
literature on FDI, these indicators are considered to be very important in attracting 
investment as they reflect the presence of a high quality and healthy workforce.  Thus, 
these socio-economic variables seem to influence the formation of industrial clusters 
and inter-state differences in the degree of industrial development.  Indeed, Delhi, 
Chennai, Bangalore and Mumbai are also well-known educational centers.  Delhi, 
Mumbai and Chennai have each an Indian Institute of Technology (IIT).  Bangalore 
houses the Indian Institute of Science (IISc), and Ahmedabad and Bangalore have 
Indian Institutes of Management (IIM). In addition, these six industrial clusters house a 
large number of engineering and technical institutions, which provide a good skill base 
for all industries. 
 Likewise, the enrolment rates of students aged 11-14 years, as a proxy 
indicator for the level of supply of an educated workforce, are higher among the states 
                                                 
5 Therefore, some industrial associations suggest that we should regard the Chennai – Bangalore belt as a single 
cluster.   
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with high levels of corporate investment and industrial concentration, than the national 
average of 67 percent.  Tamil Nadu enjoys the highest enrolment rate of 99 percent, 
followed by Maharashtra at 87 percent, Gujarat 76 percent, Karnataka 74 percent, 
Haryana 67 percent, and Andhra Pradesh 63 percent.  States with very little investment 
inflows are ranked poorly in terms of these indexes.  The high levels of educational 
performance among these six States clearly support the agglomeration literature that 
links the education and social infrastructure to the location of industrial concentration.  
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Map: 7 The Prominent Three Clusters 
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Table 3:  Indexes of Social & Economic Infrastructure & Human Development 
State Social 
Eco. 
Index 
 
Social Eco. 
Index 
Rank 
HDI Value HDI Rank Enrolment 
Ratio – 
11-14 years 
Year 2000 2000 2001 2001 2002-03 
North      
Punjab 187.57 1 0.537 2 59.09 
Haryana 137.54 4 0.509 5 67.33 
Rajastan 75.86 15 0.424 9 55.67 
UP 101.23 10 0.388 13 46.84 
Bihar 81.33 11 0.367 15 24.98 
MP 76.79 14 0.394 12 63.50 
East      
Assam 77.72 13 0.386 14 56.22 
W.Bengal 111.25 7 0.472 8 58.00 
Orissa 81 12 404 11 56.43 
West      
Gujarat 124.31 5 0.479 6 75.94 
Maharashtra 112.8 6 0.523 4 86.97 
South      
AP 103.3 9 0.416 10 63.12 
Karnataka 104.88 8 0.478 7 74.28 
Kerala 178.68 2 0.638 1 97.07 
Tamil Nadu 149.1 3 0.531 3 99.08 
All India 100 - 0.472 - 60.99 
Source: Col.2&3, 11th Finance Commission, Government of India; Rest, Economic Survey, Government of India. 
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4.  State-wise Geographical Distribution of FDI Flows 
 There are very few analytical studies on the inter-state or inter-province 
differences in FDI inflows.  However, several studies analyze inter-country differences 
in FDI emphasizing location advantages (Wei 2000; Habib and Zurawicki 2002; 
Globerman 2002; and Globerman and Shapiro 2003).  Scholars have traditionally 
identified various locational advantages such as size of the market, income, and the 
growth rate; membership of the regional union; labor and skills; infrastructure (e.g., 
transport, telecommunications, electricity, and port facilities); and institutional 
framework (customs, legal dispute settlement, and the Rule of Law).  More recent 
studies have focused on such factors as technological status, brand name, openness of 
the economy, and macro trade policies of the government, and intellectual property 
protection. Other recent studies indicate the importance of the tax rate, corruption, good 
governance, and skill content of the work force in influencing FDI (Wei 2000; Habib 
and Zurawicki 2002; Globerman and Shapiro 2003).  For example, Wei’s (2000) study 
analyzes the determinants of the bilateral stocks of FDI from 12 source countries to 45 
host countries.  The source countries include the U.S., Japan, Germany, U.K., France, 
and Italy.  In analyzing FDI, the following explanatory variables are used: tax rate, 
corruption, tax credit, political stability, GDP, population, distance between the two 
countries, linguistic ties between countries and the wage rates.  The study shows the 
overwhelming importance of the tax rate, corruption, political stability and skill content 
of the workforce in influencing FDI.   
 Habib and Zurawicki (2002) analyze the impact of corruption on FDI for 89 
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countries for the period 1996-98.  They use the corruption perception index produced 
by the Transparency International.  In explaining FDI inflows, in addition to 
corruption they also introduce the following variables: population, GDP growth, per 
capita GDP, unemployment rate, openness of the economy as measured by the ratio of 
trade to GDP, science and technology indicators, cultural distance and political stability. 
Their findings suggest that corruption is a serious obstacle for investment. Apart from 
corruption, geographical distance and economic ties also emerge as important 
determinants of FDI.   
 Globerman and Shapiro (2003) examine the statistical importance of 
government infrastructure as a determinant of FDI. They conducted the analysis in two 
stages. In the first stage the probability that a country was a recipient of US FDI was 
estimated. In the second stage their analysis was restricted to those countries that did 
receive FDI flows and estimated equations that were focused on the determinants of the 
amount of FDI received.  These measures include the following: (a) rule of law index, 
which measures contract enforcement, property rights, theft and crime; (b) political 
instability and violence index, which measures armed conflict, social unrest, ethnic 
tension and terrorists threats; (c) regulatory burden index, which measures government 
intervention, trade policy and capital restrictions; (d) government effectiveness index, 
measuring red tape and bureaucracy, wastes in government and public infrastructure; (e) 
graft and corruption index, measuring corruption among public and private officials and 
the extent of bribery; and (f) voice and accountability index, which measures civil 
liberties, political rights, free press, and fairness of the legal system. Their results 
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consistently show that governance infrastructure is an important determinant of whether 
a country will receive any US FDI, and, if so, how much.  All the governance variables 
considered in the study are relevant for inter-state analysis in India as these indicators 
differ significantly between the Indian States. The determinants of FDI locations that 
emerge from econometric studies are summarized in Chart 1. 
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Figure 1:  FDI and Locational Advantage: Factors determining FDI Inflows   
 
Traditional Advantage 
 
Other Location Advantage 
 
Technological Status 
Brand Name and Goodwill of Local Firms 
Openness of the Economy  
Macro Economic Policies, Tax rates, 
Intellectual Property Protection  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Size, Income and Growth Rate 
Membership of Regional Union 
Cost: Labor and Skills 
Infrastructure: Transport, Telecommunications, Electricity, Port facilities 
Institutions: Customs, Legal Dispute Settlements,  
Good governance: Rule of Law, IPR, Contract  enforcement, Crimes  
Political stability: Social Unrest, Ethnic Conflicts, Terrorism 
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Table 4: FDI Approvals August 1991 – June 2002 
State Amount 
 Rs. billion 
Percentage to Total 
Maharashtra 487.2 17.32 
Delhi 338.1 12.02 
Tamil Nadu 234.7 8.34 
Karnataka 219.4 7.80 
Gujarat 184.5 6.56 
Andhra Pradesh 130.9 4.65 
Madhya Pradesh 92.3 3.28 
West Bengal 88.1 3.13 
Orissa 82.3 2.92 
Rest of the states 955.8 33.98 
Total 2813.3 100 
Source: Economic Survey, Government of India. 
 As Table 4 indicates, the top six States that received high levels of FDI inflows 
are also at the top in terms of high domestic corporate investment inflows (see Table 2).  
By and large, most investments went to the coastal areas and the NCR (Delhi and the 
surrounding areas).  As Map 8 shows, the rest of the States received very little 
investment, both domestic and foreign.  Moreover, the States that received higher 
inflow of FDI enjoyed higher levels of per capita income than the Indian average.6  
For example, in 2000, the per capita income of the States with large FDI inflows were: 
Maharashtra, Rs.23,398, Delhi, Rs.35,705, and Tamil Nadu, Rs.19,141.  States with 
small FDI such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh had lower per capita income levels of 
Rs.6,328 and Rs.9,765, respectively.   
 Thus, in India, by and large, these six States stand out in terms of both 
industrial agglomeration and FDI inflows, suggesting the important role of FDI in 
forming industrial clusters: Tamil Nadu enjoys an 8 percent share in Indian FDI 
                                                 
6 The per capita income of India in the year 2000 (at current prices) was Rp. 15,562. 
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inflows; a 10 percent share in total corporate investments; ranks third in HDI and the 
socio economic index with more than 99 percent of the children in the age group of 
11-14 attending schools; and produces 6 percent each of pharmaceuticals and consumer 
electronics.  In the case of automobiles (to be discussed in the next section) it produces 
about 35 percent of auto components and houses three major auto manufacturing firms, 
namely, Hyundai, Ford and Ashok Leyland.  
 Karnataka accounts for 7.8 percent of FDI inflows; an 8.86 percent of corporate 
investment; ranks eight in socio economic index and seven in HDI with more than 74 
percent of children in the age group of 11-14 attending school; produces 15 percent of 
electronic hardware; and 10 percent of consumer electronics.  
 Andhra Pradesh accounts for about 5 percent of FDI inflows; a 9.7 percent of 
total corporate investment, occupies ninth rank in socio economic index and is tenth in 
the HDI with more than 63 percent of children in the age group of 11-14 attending 
schools; produces about 10 percent of pharmaceuticals and 9 percent of consumer 
electronics. Among the Southern States Andhra has done relatively poorly in the socio 
economic and human development index.  Correspondingly, it has also not done very 
well in terms of investment inflows. 
 Maharashtra attracts 17 percent of FDI; a 12 percent of corporate investment; 
occupies the rank sixth in the socio economic indicators and fourth in HDI with more 
than 86 percent of children in the age groups of 11-14 attending schools;  produces 
about 26 percent of pharmaceuticals; 9 percent of electronics hardware; and 27 percent 
of consumer electronics.  It also houses two of India’s leading auto companies, namely, 
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Bajaj Auto and Tata Motors.  
 Gujarat gets 6.56 percent of FDI inflows; a 19 percent of corporate 
investments; occupies the fifth rank in socio economic indicators and the sixth position 
in HDI with more than 74 percent of children in the age group of 11-14 years attending 
schools; produces 15 percent of pharmaceuticals and 12 percent of electronics hardware.  
 The NCR, which includes Delhi and parts of Haryana and Uttar Pradesh that 
are adjacent to Delhi, accounts for 12 percent of FDI flows; 13 percent of corporate 
investment; 22 percent of electronic hardware production; and 32 percent of consumer 
electronics production. While Haryana has a reasonably good school enrolment ratio of 
67 percent, Uttar Pradesh has a miserable 46 percent.  
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Map 8: Distribution of FDI by State 
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5.  A Study of Two Auto Clusters: Chennai and the National Capital Region 
  
In this section we focus on two of India’s leading clusters of another key manufacturing 
industry, the automobile industry located in, namely, Chennai (the state capital of Tamil 
Nadu) and the NCR, and consider the factors that contributed to the development of 
these clusters.   
5.1  The Evolution of the Indian Automobile Industry  
 Before considering the two clusters, we briefly outline the historical evolution 
of auto clusters in India.  During the mid-1950s, the automotive industry started in 
India.  Before then, India imported cars and most spare parts.  Large family-owned 
conglomerates, locally known as business houses, took the lead in the import of cars 
and spare parts.  The main importers of spare parts were the TVS group and the 
Amalgamations group in Madras (now renamed as Chennai), Anand and Nandas 
(Escorts) in Delhi, and Doshi in Bombay (now Mumbai).  In 1957, the Indian Tariff 
Commission decided to discourage imports and encourage the manufacturing of 
automobiles and spare parts in India as part of India’s inward-looking import 
substitution industrialization strategy.  Consequently, the main importers entered into 
manufacturing: The Birla group (Hindustan Motors, setting up a plant in Calcatta to 
produce Ambassador); Doshi (Premier Auto in Bombay). Standard Motors (Standard 
Herald in Madras). the Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. (TELCO; recently 
renamed as Tata Motors, one of over 120 affiliated firms of the Tata group) (in 
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Jamshedpur in the state of Bihar to produce Tata trucks),7 and Ashok Leyland (in 
Madras, to assemble Leyland trucks and chassis).  Thus, auto clusters have started to 
emerge in Mumbai and Chennai. 
 Out of these initial ventures, except for TELCO and Ashok Leyland, the rest 
have ceased to be important players or have gone out of business.  This is partly 
because the government, through the implementation of its 1963 Monopolies and 
Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) policy, which introduced an extensive licensing 
regime, restricted the activities of large private business houses in order to control 
monopolies and the growth of private firms and to promote public-sector enterprises 
(Encarnation 1989; Okada 2000).  Moreover, the government had also restricted the 
inflow of FDI since the early 1970s, both in terms of the sectors to enter and the equity 
share, to promote the localization of the domestic industries and limit FDI only to the 
sectors that accorded with the government priority (Lall 1987; Encarnation 1989; Okada 
2000).8  These policies have resulted in a stagnation of the automobile industry in 
terms of both output growth and technological development for more than two decades 
until the mid-1980s, when the government started gradually lifting these inward-looking 
and restrictive policies, and entered into a joint venture with Suzuki Motors to establish 
MUL, as discussed in more details in the subsequent subsections.  
 With the Indian government’s introduction of the new economic policy and 
new industrial policy in 1991, the Indian automobile industry has experienced rapid 
                                                 
7 Initially, TELCO entered into a joint venture with Mercedez-Benz, as a half of the 120 Tata affliated firms did, in 
the late 1950s, but the partnership expired in 1962 (Encarnation, 1989). 
8 The government restricted the inflow of foreign capital, and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) of 1974 
forced foreign investors to keep their share to 40% or less (Lall 1987).  For the detailed discussions of this policy 
and its effects, see Lall 1987. 
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transformations, with many new entrants forming joint ventures with foreign car 
manufacturers, drastically changing the structure of the automobile industry.  By the 
mid-1990s, the Indian automobile industry consisted of about two dozen assemblers of 
different vehicle types and the component manufacturing industry, which in turn 
consisted of about 350 large- and medium-scale firms in the organized sector, and 
approximately 6,000 small firms, which are mostly in the unorganized sector (ACMA 
1995). 
 
5.2 Chennai Auto Cluster 
 
 Currently, as a leading auto cluster in India, Chennai (or Tamil Nadu) accounts 
for 21 percent of passenger cars, 33 percent of commercial vehicles and 35 percent of of 
the auto components produced in India.  At present, over 100 medium and large auto 
companies are located in and around the Chennai cluster.  In the auto component 
industry, Tamil Nadu has a more than 50 percent share in the production of inlet and 
exhaust valves, valve guides, valve tappets, fuel pumps, oil pump assembly, thermostat, 
timings chair, water pump assembly, starter motors, alternators, camshafts, oil seals, 
brake linings, wiper motors, air brake assembly and engines.  It enjoys between a 30 
and 50 percent share in the voltage regulations, flywheel magnetos, steering gears, 
wheel rims, electric horns, and dashboard instruments.  Further, it has between a 10 
and 30 percent share in delivery valves, crankshafts, bi-metal bearings, radiators, clutch 
plates, clutch assembly, shock absorbers, tyres and automotive seats.  Most of them 
have ISO certification and about a quarter of them have QS certification.  Chennai’s 
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emergence as one of India’s leading auto clusters is due to historical, political and 
economic factors, as discussed below: 
 
5.2.1   The Emergence of Chennai Auto Cluster 
 
 First, when the Tariff Commission decided to discourage imports and favor the 
domestic production of automobiles and spare parts, several Tamil Nadu-based firms 
like TVS and Standard Motors were already at the forefront.  For example, the TVS 
group set-up plants in Madras (Chennai) and developed an important industrial enclave 
in a locality called Padi at the outskirts of the city.  The emergence of Madras, 
Bombay, and Calcutta as important auto clusters until the early 1960s is partly because 
these cities had important seaports.  Clearly, proximity to a seaport was an important 
consideration for the formation of the auto clusters in the earlier years, as until the early 
1960s the industry (including the component sector) heavily depended on imports.  
 Second, during the late 1950s and the early 1960s, these local firms were 
actively supported and promoted by the Government of Tamil Nadu, (which was earlier 
called Madras State) and in particular, its Chief Minister, K. Kamaraj, the Industry 
Minister, R. Venkataraman (who later-on became a Member of the Indian Planning 
Commission and the President of India) and T. T. Krishnamachari.9 These political 
leaders were instrumental in giving industrial licenses to firms to set up heavy vehicles 
factories and truck manufacturing plants in and around Chennai.  
 Third, several Tamil Nadu-based industrialists, such as those of the TVS group, 
                                                 
9 T.T. Krishnamachari was from Tamil Nadu and occupied some key cabinet ministerial positions in the 
Government of India including that of Finance, Commerce and Industry, playing a key role in the development of the 
auto industry in Tamil Nadu. 
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MRF, Ashok Leyland, Standard Motors, and the Rane group, played a notable role in 
forming the auto cluster in Chennai.10  For example, Mammen Mappillai, who started 
off with a toy balloon plant in a small shed in Tiruvottiyur (a Madras suburb) in 1946, 
became one of the largest tyre manufacturers in India.  In 1952, he started 
manufacturing tread rubber, which gradually blossomed into MRF with the technical 
collaboration with Mansfield Tire and Rubber Company, US, in 1961. By 1967, MRF 
had started exporting tyres to the U.S.11   
 
5.2.2  Capacity Building: Infrastructure, Human Resources and Institutions 
 Several additional factors explain the subsequent development of the Chennai 
cluster after its initial formation in the 1950s.  One important factor that attracts FDI 
and domestic firms in auto and information technology (IT) industries in Chennai is the 
adequate infrastructure – both physical (particularly reliable telecom network), and of 
human resources (a steady supply of skilled workforce), and government interventions 
in terms of investments in technology parks including IT and auto parks.  With regard 
to human resources, Tamil Nadu produces the largest number of engineering graduates 
in the country (Ramachandran and Goebel 2002).  In Chennai, several engineering 
colleges are located, including the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), the Guindy 
Engineering College, and the A. C. College of Technology.  In addition, some regional 
engineering colleges and several private engineering colleges were also established in 
                                                 
10 They include T. V. Sundaram Iyengar (TVS group); Mammen Mapillai (MRF); Raghubir Saran (Ashok 
Leyland); Gopalakrishnan of Union Motors (Standard 10, Standard Companion, and Standard Herald and Gazel); N. 
Mahalingam, (Anamalai Body Building Works for trucks and buses and Anamalai Tyre Retreading); L. G. Brothers 
(body building and auto equipment); L. L. Narayanan (Rane Group, producing steering wheels and brake linings); 
and Anantharama Krishnan (India Pistons, Tractors and Farm Equipment and SRVS ).   
11 Even today tyres for Rolls-Royce cars roll out from MRF.   
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Tamil Nadu.  As industrial estates were set up, several technical institutes to train 
technicians and mechanics were simultaneously set up.  Moreover, the State 
government introduced a mid-day meal program in primary and secondary schools to 
improve attendance in the schools and reduce dropout rates.  Thus, from primary 
schools to highly sophisticated engineering institutes, Tamil Nadu already had the 
education institutions in place in the late 1950s.  Furthermore, during the 1980s, 
several new engineering colleges were set up both by the government and the private 
sector.  Lower-level technical institutions such as the government-run Industrial 
Training Institutes (ITI) to train technicians proliferated, and consequently Tamil Nadu 
emerged as the state that produced the largest number of technical graduates. The state 
government has also involved the private sector in training workers and professionals.  
At the same time, the mid-day meal program in primary and secondary schools was 
strengthened and its scope widened. As a result, as discussed earlier, 99 percent of 
children in the age group of 11 – 14 attend schools – the highest percentage in India.     
 With regard to infrastructure, Chennai has an international airport and two sea 
ports, the second one was recently constructed at distance of 25 kilometres from the city.  
In addition to the two Chennai ports, Tamil Nadu has an all-weather port at Tuticorin, as 
well as two intermediate and six minor ports.   
 Moreover, the State government gives a number of financial incentives like 
capital subsidies, power tariff concessions, sales tax waiver and other schemes to firms 
located at the industrial estates created by the State government.  Moreover, four major 
state agencies are actively involved in soliciting and facilitating FDI in the State: 
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Electronic Corporation of Tamil Nadu Ltd; the State Industrial Promotion Council of 
Tamil Nadu Ltd.; Tamil Nadu Industrial Guidance and Export Promotion Bureau; and 
Electronics Test and Development Center.  
 The human and physical infrastructure provided by the government and the 
presence of large component manufacturing firms attracted global firms like the Ford, 
Hyundai and Mitsubishi to set-up plants in Chennai.  The arrival of these firms had a 
major impact on the Chennai auto cluster resulting in a radical restructuring of the 
industry. Till the early 1990s, Tamil Nadu was mainly producing components to the 
Indian market. The main auto component suppliers of Chennai like the TVS and 
Amalgamations groups made strategic use of the government’s earlier policies like 
subsidized access to overseas technology, support for participation in international trade 
fairs, and have emerged globally competitive to face the current WTO regime (Tewari 
2003). 
 
5.2.3  Lead firms in Chennai Cluster 
 Several Chennai-based firms, which are mostly Indian conglomerates, have 
played a critical role as lead firms in the development of the Chennai auto cluster, 
including the TVS Group, the Rane Group, and Ashok Leyland Ltd.  The TVS Group   
originally started as a transport company in 1911 and now has over 29 companies as 
India’s leading suppliers of automotive components, many with FDI involvement.12  
For example, a group firm, Wheels India Ltd., was set-up as a joint venture between 
                                                 
12 TVS & Sons Ltd., the parent and holding company of the TVS group, was established in 1911 and now has 
become the largest automobile distribution company in India with a turnover of more than US $450 million.    
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TVS and Dunlop, UK., in 1960, and was located in Padi at the outskirts of Chennai. 
Engaged in producing wheels for commercial vehicles, cars, jeeps, tractors, construction 
equipment, earth moving equipment, and defence vehicles, it supplies components to all 
the vehicle manufacturers in India.  Another group firm, Lucas-TVS, a joint venture 
with the Lucas Variety group, UK and the TVS group, was established in 1961 and is a 
leading manufacturer of auto electrical products and diesel fuel injection equipment in 
India.  It covers all segments of the auto industry – passenger cars, jeeps, light and 
heavy commercial vehicles, industrial engines, tractors and two wheelers.  Its products 
include starter motors, alternators, dynamos, regulators, wiping systems, blower motors, 
fan motors, power window systems, ignition systems and horns.   
 Other group firms such as Brakes India, Sundaram Clayton Ltd., Sundaram 
Fastners Ltd., and Turbo Energy Ltd., were all established in the 1960s, as a joint 
ventures with British firms, and are all located in Padi at the outskirts of Chennai.  
Brakes India, incorporated in 1962 as a joint venture between TVS & Sons and Lucas 
Industries Plc., U.K., to manufacture brake equipment, caters to over 60 percent of the 
domestic OEM market and exports to over 35 countries.  Sundaram Clayton Ltd. is the 
first firm to manufacture brake systems in India and has been the market leader since its 
inception.  It exports to U.S., U.K., Egypt, Australia, Sri Lanka, Middle East and East 
Asian countries.  Sundaram Fasteners Ltd. has emerged as the largest manufacturer of 
high tensile fasteners in India and is the key supplier of radiator caps to General Motors 
(GM)’s U.S. plants.  It manufactures standard fasteners like hex head bolts, screws and 
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nuts; special fasteners like connecting rods bolts and nuts, cylinder head bolts and nuts, 
main bearing cap bolts, and wheel.   
 Similarly, other Chennai-based group firms established in the 1980s and the 
early 1990s such as Turbo Energy Ltd.,13 India Nippon Electricals Ltd., Sundaram 
Dynacast Ltd, also have technical and financial collaboration with component 
manufacturers abroad such as Germany, Japan, and the U.S., producing key components 
such as turbo changers, electronic ignition systems, and precision engineering 
components.  India Nippon Electricals Ltd., established in 1985 as a joint venture 
between Lucas Indian Service and Kokusan Denki Co. Ltd, Japan, manufactures 
electronic ignition systems for two wheelers and portable gensets.  Its products are 
fitted on vehicles manufactured by TVS Motors, Bajaj Auto, Hero Honda, Hero Punch 
and other two wheelers.  Sundaram Dynacast Ltd., incorporated in 1993 as a joint 
venture between Dynacast International, UK., Brakes India and Sundaram Finance, to 
manufacture small precision engineering components at its Padi (Chennai) plant. It 
caters to the automotive, electrical, electronic, clock industries and writing instruments. 
For automobiles it produces tyre valves, spark plug terminal caps, components for two 
and four wheelers. It exports automotive and industrial fasteners. 
 TVS Cherry Limited, established in 1994 as a joint venture between TVS and 
Cherry Electric Corporation, USA, manufactures precision miniature, sub-miniature, 
selector switches and hall effect sensors for the appliances industry, office automation 
                                                 
13 The firm was established in 1982 in technical and financial collaboration with Aktiengesellschaft Kuhnle, Kopp 
& Kausch, Germany. Its manufacturing plant is located in Chennai and Vellore (Tamil Nadu), and its R&D unit in 
Padi, Chennai. 
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and industrial applications. It also produces key switches and advanced 
performance/special purpose keyboards for the IT industry.  India Japan Lighting Ltd., 
incorporated in 1996 is a joint venture between Lucas-TVS and Koito Manufacturing 
Co. Ltd., Japan, which is a company that has been in business for over 80 years and is a 
leader in lighting equipment in Japan. The joint venture manufactures headlamps, rear 
combination lamps, signal lamps and other small lamps. The factory is located at the 
outskirts of Chennai.   
 TVS Motor Co. Ltd. is one of the largest growing companies in India and is the 
largest manufacturer of the sub 100 cc two wheelers in the world. It exports its range of 
products to 17 countries worldwide. Its products include motorcycles, mopeds, 
scooterettes, and scooters.  It originally started as TVS – Suzuki, a joint venture 
between the TVS group and Suzuki Motors of Japan and started manufacturing Suzuki 
100cc motorcycles in 1984. During 1999-2000, TVS – Suzuki was amalgamated with 
Sundaram Auto Engineers Ltd., an unlisted TVS group company. Suzuki ceased to be a 
shareholder of the company in the year 2000-2001.  
 Likewise, the Rane Group has many group firms manufacturing automotive 
components in Chennai.  For example, its flagship firm, Rane Engine Valves Ltd., was 
established in 1959, manufacturing engine valves, valve guides, tappets, crank shafts for 
compressors and clutch boosters, which are exported to Australia, the Far East, 
Germany, Iran, Italy, Middle East, U.K. and U.S.  Other main group firms include 
Rane Brake Linings, Rane Madras, Rane NSK Steering Systems, the Rane TRW 
Steering Systems, producing a wide range of products, such as brake linings, disc pads, 
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clutch facing and railway brake blocks, valves for internal combustion engines, seat 
belts, power steerings,. hydraulic steering pumps, safety seat belt system and emergency 
locking retractors. Rane Brake Linings Ltd., has developed asbestos free material, and 
has also developed and commercialized new formulations for the new range of vehicles.  
Kar Mobiles Ltd., established in 1974, is the second largest manufacturer of valves for 
internal combustion engines in India. It has technical collaboration with TRW, the U.S. 
Its exports constitute 50 percent of its turnover and it is the first firm in India to be 
designated as vendor by the General Motors, the U.S.  Furthermore, Rane TRW 
Steering Systems Ltd., established in 1987, is a 50:50 joint venture with TRW and has 
technical collaboration with UNISIA JKC, Japan.  It produces integrated power 
steerings, power racks and pinion steering, hydraulic steering pumps, safety seat belt 
systems and emergency locking retractors.  Rane NSK Steering Systems Ltd., 
established in 1995 and started  production in 1997.  It also is a 50:50 joint venture 
with NSK Japan, producing solid steering columns, energy absorbing and collapsible 
columns, tilt and telescopic steering columns, intermediate shafts and universal joint 
assemblies.  Clearly, these industrial houses (conglomerates) have played a critical role 
in developing Chennai’s auto cluster.  
 Ashok Leyland Ltd. (ALL), established in 1948 as Ashok Motors, the 
second-largest manufacturer of medium/heavy commercial vehicles in India today, also 
initially started to assemble Austin car parts in India.  In 1955, however, it entered into 
an agreement with Leyland Motors, U.K., to manufacture Leyland vehicles and changed 
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its name to Ashok Leyland.14  ALL’s manufacturing plants are located at Ennore 
(Chennai), Ambattur (Chennai), Hosur (Tamil Nadu). Recently it has also established 
plants outside Tamil Nadu—in Bhandara (Maharashtra), Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh) 
and Alwar (Rajastan). During 2003/04 it produced 12,996 commercial vehicles in the 
medium and heavy category and exported 1,604 vehicles.  ALL and Sundaram 
Industries (TVS group) have together joined hands with Irizar of Spain, to float a joint 
venture company, Irizar TVS, to manufacture bus bodies in India.  The assets of TVS 
Coach (the erstwhile JV of Sundaram Industries and ALL), which owns two bus body 
building factories in Tamil Nadu have been transferred to the new joint venture 
company, Irizar TVS in which all the three partners have equal shareholdings.    
 Interestingly, therefore, except ALL, the lead firms in the Chennai auto cluster 
are rather than assemblers, all component manufacturers that were established in the 
1960s, long before India’s motorization started, making Chennai quite unique, 
compared to other auto clusters in India or elsewhere.  
 
5.2.4  Industrial Estates and Small Firms 
 The Chennai cluster also comprises of small industries. The entrepreneurial 
skills of many small firms have contributed to the success of the auto cluster (Sridhar 
2002).  Chennai has several industrial estates, providing factory space at relatively low 
rents and other facilities to firms operating there.  The Guindy industrial estate – the 
largest in Chennai – was established by the State government in 1958 in a 100 acres plot.  
                                                 
14 The Hinduja Group and IVECO, Italy (a subsidiary of Fiat) acquired Leyland, UK in 1987 thus making Land 
Rover Leyland International, UK as the holding company of ALL. The Holding company holds 50.9% of stake in 
ALL s equity. 
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The estate provides technical services like mechanical, metallurgical and chemical 
testing laboratories, tool rooms, forging and a heat treatment shop and a wire drawing 
unit. It also has a library and technical information section.  Chennai also houses other 
industrial estates at Ambattur, Arumbakkam, Villivakkam, Kodungaiyur, Madhavaram 
and Perambur.  Currently, the smaller firms have also tended to globalize and started 
exporting to large MNEs.  
 Two factors facilitated the globalization process of the small firms operating 
from several industrial estates located in Chennai in recent years.  First, the presence of 
a large number of IT firms in Chennai that have enabled them to take advantage of 
Business to Business Commerce (B2B commerce).  Second, because of the decision of 
the U.S. government to discourage or even prevent the establishment of forging and 
casting firms, several MNEs have been outsourcing these activities to overseas firms, 
and Chennai has been a beneficiary of this emerging practice. 
   
5.2.5  Recent Growth of the Information Technology Industry and the Auto 
Cluster 
 Furthermore, in the 1990s onwards, the growth of IT industry in Tamil Nadu 
complemented that of the auto components sector (Tewari 2003).  The Chennai auto 
cluster increasingly moved into the production of parts with IT-enabled systems for 
OEMs as well as for their suppliers.  Further, the rise of IT capabilities among local 
firms in Tamil Nadu has made it easier for non-proximate regional suppliers in the auto 
components sector to work closely with distant customers and their multi-locational 
networks (Tewari 2003).  Thus, Tamil Nadu firms developed an advantage in bidding 
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for export contracts for small, standard parts on-line and receiving requests for quotas 
(RFQs) from global players like GM and Ford.  
 The good performance of the Chennai components industry did not result 
automatically from a neo-liberal deregulation of the economy since 1991 or from the 
arrival of MNEs in the auto sector. It occurred due to the way the government handled 
the deregulation of the auto-sector: the current success of the industry is mainly due to 
the pace and the sequencing of the government’s liberalization of the sector, which was 
highly graded and strategic (Tewari 2003).  
 
5.2.6  The Arrival of Global Assemblers in the 1990s 
 Following the de-licensing by the government of the auto industry in 1993, the 
automobile industry witnessed rapid transformations with the entry of many global 
players into India in the 1990s, making the domestic market increasingly competitive.  
During 1996 and 1999, the arrival of Ford, Hyundai and Hindustan Motors Ltd. (HML) 
(via a licensing agreement with Mitsubishi Motors)15 further transformed the Chennai 
auto cluster, as they have established passenger car production and assembly operations 
in Chennai. They have invested $1.5 billion in Tamil Nadu (Tewari 2003) and have 
established a combined capacity of 230,000 cars per year:  Hyundai has invested about 
$1 billion, Ford about $400 million and HM-Mitsubishi about $150 million.  Hyundai 
has succeeded in emerging as the second most important car manufacturer after Maruti 
Udyog Ltd. (MUL) in a very short period.  Ford in Tamil Nadu from its very inception 
                                                 
15 Hindustan Motors’s Chennai plant is engaged in manufacturing of Lancer cars in technical collaboration with 
Mitsubishi Motors, and in manufacturing and sales of the spare parts used in the Lancer cars. 
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has been concentrating on building its global platform apart from targeting the Indian 
market.  Consequently, Ford and Hyundai are very active in the exports market.  Thus, 
during January-December 2003, Ford exported 24,000 cars and Hyundai 30,000 cars. 
The arrival of these MNEs has clearly boosted the components sector in the Chennai 
cluster, as they are required to increase their local content.  After the 1991 new 
economic policy and the 1991 new industrial policy, in its interest to promote FDI, the 
Indian government deliberately formed no specific policy on the automobile sector with 
respect to local content.  While its Phased Manufacturing Program (PMP) was lifted in 
1992, however, the government still implicitly demanded 50 percent local content in 
approving foreign collaboration proposals in the 1990s; this would rise to 70 percent 
after five years, often specified in the “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU) signed 
with each new entrant on a case-by-case basis (Humphrey et al. 1998; Okada 2000).  
 Hyundai has set up a 100 percent subsidiary firm (its largest investment outside 
South Korea) in 1998.  It initially brought about 14 South Korean component suppliers 
to the Hyundai plant in Korea, to supply components that are not available in Chennai. 
Nevertheless, in Chennai, these Korean component manufacturers have been sourcing 
materials and parts from small firms in industrial estates located in and around Chennai.  
Currently about 50 percent of the components are sourced by Hyundai from Tamil Nadu 
and about 85 percent of the components are sourced from India. Hyundai has about 70 
major component suppliers; of these, only 14 are Korean joint ventures and the rest are 
mainly Tamil Nadu-based firms.  Recently, Hyundai has announced a plan to build a 
second assembly plant in Chennai next to its current plant.  The new plant will have an 
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annual capacity of 150,000 units and will be constructed on a 74.2 million square foot 
site.  With this the Hyundai’s manufacturing capacity in Chennai will increase to 
400,000 vehicles.  In addition to serving the Indian market, it will cater to the export 
markets in Europe, Latin America and he Middle East.  During 2003/04, Hyundai 
produced 170,942 cars of which 135,008 were in the compact car segment, 34,698 in 
the mid-size segment (in the latter, Hyundai is the market leader, followed by Tata 
Motors, which produces 28,107 vehicles), and in the premium class segment, it 
produces 1,236 cars, while exporting 35,752 compact cars and 6,363 mid-size cars. 
 Ford imports some of the key parts but claims 75 percent local content. 
However, the local suppliers have joint ventures with US firms or have entered into 
technology licensing with US firms.  Within two years of its operation in Chennai, 
Ford opted for global sourcing of components from Tamil Nadu.  It also had 
short-listed global suppliers from Tamil Nadu.  During 2003/04, Ford sold 45,035 cars 
of which 44,881 were mid-size cars and 154 premium cars, while exporting 25,000 
mid-size cars. 
 In contrast to Ford and Hyundai, HM-Mitsubishi is mainly dependent on 
imported components from Japan; its local sourcing is only about 30 percent.  The 
import intensity of HM-Mitsubishi is attributed to its very low volume and 
concentration on the luxury segment where price competition does not prevail (Tewari 
2003).  The other two producers have a presence in all the segments and recognize the 
importance of volume and hence their preference for Chennai and Tamil Nadu-based 
suppliers.  Thus, agglomeration of the automotive component industry in Chennai, 
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mainly led by Indian business houses with foreign collaboration, preceded the entry of 
large assembler firms in the cluster.  It is only in the last several years that foreign auto 
makers have become the lead firms.  
 In sum, several factors were critical in the formation and development of the 
Chennai auto cluster.  First, the government intervention both at the Center and State 
levels played a crucial role in the emergence and later development of the Chennai 
cluster.  In the late 1950s and early 1960, Tamil Nadu had very dynamic political 
leadership that was instrumental in bringing auto component firms to Chennai.  The 
State government also established many industrial estates to promote small firms and 
ancillary units, many producing auto components. 
 Second, the presence of well-developed infrastructure, particularly access to a 
seaport, airport and other infrastructure facilities attracted entrepreneurs to opt for Tamil 
Nadu, and in particular, Chennai.  Third, the presence of well-established Indian 
family-owned business houses in Tamil Nadu like the TVS group, the Rane group, and 
the Chettiars (who are mainly bankers and business men) further helped.  Fourth, 
Chennai and other cities in Tamil Nadu enjoy a secure supply of a highly skilled 
workforce through several engineering colleges, including India’s prestigious Indian 
Institute of Technology (IIT).   
 Fifth, small firms and ancillary units played a very important role in the 
development of the Chennai cluster.  The TVS, Rane and the Amalgamations Groups 
set-up ancillary and component units in the late 1950s and early 1960s and were 
instrumental in developing industrial clusters in North Chennai.  The TVS group in 
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particular, developed the Padi enclave at the outskirts of Chennai. These auto 
component manufacturing firms, targeted the all-India market and not the limited 
Chennai market from inception.  The scale of operations of the two auto assemblers – 
Standard Motors (it has since gone out of business) and Ashok Leyland, were not large 
enough to sustain the component manufacturers.  Having established themselves 
firmly and having developed industrial enclaves, these firms and the TVS group in 
particular, kept expanding their activities by continuously starting new ventures and 
adding new product lines to their existing ventures.  Several small firms set up plants 
in the industrial estates to supply material and smaller components to these groups.  
The presence of these major component producing groups and small suppliers located in 
the industrial estates located in and around Chennai encouraged the entry of large global 
players like Ford, Hyundai and Mitsubishi in the late 1990s.   
 Finally, the emergence of the IT industry in Chennai and Tamil Nadu and the 
rapid development of the internet infrastructure have helped small and medium firms to 
globalize and take advantage of B2B commerce.  In this respect, the patterns of 
development of the Chennai cluster differ considerably from other clusters elsewhere 
such as in Viet Nam and China (Kuchiki 2004), where a large assembling firm serves as 
the lead firm helping set up and develop ancillaries.  Interestingly, by contrast, in the 
Chennai cluster, the direction of the development was different. 
 
5.3 National Capital Region (NCR) Cluster 
 
 In the development of the NCR auto cluster consisting of Haryana, Delhi and 
some districts of Utter Pradesh adjacent to Delhi, Maruti Udyog Ltd. (MUL) played a 
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leading role.  Therefore, this cluster, by and large, follows the traditional pattern of 
auto clusters led by assemblers that served as lead firms.  
 
 
5.3.1  The Growth of the Passenger Car Segment and the Emergence of an 
Industrial Leader  
 
Maruti Udyog Ltd. started in 1982 as a joint venture firm between the Indian 
government and a Japanese automaker, Suzuki Motor Corporation.16  Maruti Udyog 
Ltd. set up its first plant in Gurgaon, then a newly developing industrial town in 
Haryana adjacent to Delhi, as a “greenfield” plant.  It was the first modern assembly 
plant in India, as it was a close copy of Suzuki’s Kosai plant in Japan, in terms of plant 
layout, equipment, the organization of production and the operating principle.  It set up 
its second plant in Gurgaon in 1992, and third plant in NOIDA, also as part of the NCR, 
in 1999.  The firm started its production by 1983.  It has since emerged as the largest 
car manufacturer in India, by initially focusing on the small car segment, which had 
been virtually untapped in the Indian market until Maruti Udyog Ltd’s entry.  Maruti 
Udyog Ltd. cars were 21 percent cheaper than the lowest-priced existing passenger car 
produced by domestic manufacturers, yet offered much higher quality, more safety 
features and greater fuel efficiency (Humphrey et al. 1998; Okada 2000).  In response 
to the increased variety in consumer tastes, in the early 1990s, the firm also diversified 
                                                 
16 Initially, Sanjay Gandhi, the elder son of then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, started Maruti Ltd., as a private firm 
to achieve his dream of producing a “national car.”  Due to some political problem, however, it never started 
operation.  Indira Gandhi’s government nationalized the firm in 1980, after the death of Sanjay to achieve her son’s 
dream. Advised that the project would not succeed without the involvement of foreign technology, the government 
decided to have a joint venture, and signed joint-venture and license agreements with Suzuki in 1982 (Interview with 
a former CEO, Maruti Udyog Ltd., at Harvard, February 1998).  MUL remained as a state enterprise until 1992, 
when the government’s share of equity was reduced from 60% to 49.9%, in accordance with government policy 
change that allowed state enterprises to form joint ventures (Okada 2000).  However, the government recently 
announced its policy to disinvest from MUL, allowing it to become Suzuki’s subsidiary firm.   
 63
its product range, introducing new middle-sized passenger cars. 
As Figure 1 indicates, the growth in the passenger car segment of the Indian auto 
industry has largely been driven by Maruti Udyog Ltd..  In 1996/97, it produced 
336,811 passenger cars, accounting for 79.6 percent of the Indian passenger car 
market.17  In 2003, it established the foundry plant of Suzuki Metal India Ltd, a joint 
venture between Suzuki Motor Corporation and Maruti Udyog Ltd.. Interestingly, even 
after the entry of many foreign car manufacturers in India since the mid-1990s which 
intensified the competition within the Indian market, Maruti Udyog Ltd. continued to 
remain dominant.  By 2003/04, Maruti Udyog Ltd. increased its production up to 
408,911 cars, of which 216,163 were compact cars and 14,384 mid-sized; it does not 
produce cars in the premium and executive segment.  It exported in the compact 
segment 39,454 cars and in the mid-size segment 314 cars. 
 
                                                 
17 MUL’s Annual Report 1996-97. 
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Figure 1: Trends in Passenger Car Production in India by Manufacturer 
Passenger Car Production by Manufacturers
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 In addition to Maruti Udyog Ltd., in the 1990s, other foreign car manufacturers 
such as Daewoo Motors India Ltd. (a joint venture with Daewoo Corporation, Korea) 
and Honda Siel Cars India Ltd. (a joint venture with Honda Corporation, Japan) started 
their operations in the NCR.  However, their contributions to the NCR cluster are too 
modest, as Daewoo was in operation only for a few years and ceased its operation after 
its parent in Korea failed, and Honda Siel started its production only in 2000/01 and its 
production volume is still very small (17,953 mid-size cars and 2,031 premium cars and 
exported 27 mid-size cars in 2003/04).  Thus, the NCR auto cluster’s development has 
been mainly driven by Maruti Udyog Ltd’s. remarkable growth as shown in Figure 1. 
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5.3.2  Maruti Udyog Ltd.’s Supplier Development Strategy  
 Maruti Udyog Ltd.’s experience is unique in India particularly in terms of its 
system of procurements and enormous efforts to develop first-tier suppliers in its 
proximity and upgrade their capabilities.  Maruti Udyog Ltd.’s supplier development 
was one of the key factors for reducing production costs, and thereby a key factor for 
the firm’s remarkable growth (see Figure 1).  It also became a successful model of 
transferring know-how of the non-keiretsu production system (Hattori 1996). And, 
given its dominance in the domestic car market, and a high rate of local content (96 
percent for the “Maruti 800” and over 75 percent for other models) (Okada, 2000), it 
had a tremendous impact on the development of the automotive component industry as 
a whole, and in particular, that of the NCR auto cluster.  
 Both Maruti Udyog Ltd. and Suzuki hold equities to transfer technology and 
develop a long-term relationship in about a dozen Maruti Udyog Ltd. first-tier suppliers 
of key components. Several key suppliers of important bulky items like seats, fuel tanks, 
bumpers and instrument panels, such as Bharat Seats are present, in the same complex 
as Maruti Udyog Ltd.’s main plant in Gurgaon, allowing Maruti Udyog Ltd. to gain 
greater control over their operation and performance standards.  Suzuki invested about 
15 percent each in the equities of Bharat Seats, Macino Plastics, and Subros (a car 
air-conditioner manufacturer with collaboration with Denso).  Maruti Udyog Ltd. also 
has a 10 to 15 percent equity share in Macino Plastics, Asahi Safety Glass and Sona 
Steering, about a 24 percent equity in Mark Auto Industry, and a 31 percent in Jay 
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Bharat.  Moreover, Maruti Udyog Ltd. and Suzuki arranged a joint venture between 
local suppliers and Suzuki’s suppliers in Japan.  For example, Bharat Seats has 
technological ties with Howa Industry, a supplier of seats to Suzuki in Japan; Asahi 
India has ties with Asahi Glass; Sona Steering received technology from Koyo 
Precision Industry; and Subros received technology from Denso.  Similarly, 
Motherson’s was encouraged to collaborate with Sumitomo Denso to form a joint 
venture firm Motherson Sumi, and JVC with Daikin industry.18  Furthermore, Maruti 
Udyog Ltd. has made enormous efforts to upgrade the capabilities of its suppliers 
(Okada 2004).   
 Table 5 shows the geographical distribution of Maruti Udyog Ltd.’s first-tier 
suppliers as of 1997.  As the table indicates, about 60 percent of Maruti Udyog Ltd.’s 
first-tier suppliers are located within the NCR cluster.  Apart from key suppliers 
housed in Maruti Udyog Ltd.’s complex, many other component manufacturers 
producing such items as lamps, mirrors, front and rear windows, clutches, 
shock-absorbers, front axles, leaf springs, wire-harnesses, gaskets, door locks, switches, 
piston rings, valves, air conditioners, wheel rims, are also located in the NCR.  As of 
1997, 58 out of the 404 Maruti Udyog Ltd. first-tier suppliers depended on Maruti 
Udyog Ltd. for more than 90 percent (in many cases 100%) of their sales.19  Also, one 
                                                 
18 This system differs from the Toyota style, where most component manufacturing firms either belonged to Toyota 
keiretsu or received technology from the Toyota related firms (Hattori 1996).  This is because Suzuki, as a relatively 
small assembler in Japan, has a relatively supplier base at home, compared to other larger assemblers such as Toyota 
and Nissan.  It has a “kyoryokukai” (supplier association formed by a car manufacturer) only for its small suppliers 
located near its plants (Fujimoto and Takeishi 1994).  When MUL started its operation in India, few dedicated 
suppliers of Suzuki could afford to follow Suzuki to India to supply parts for MUL (Okada 2000). 
 
19 Data are from MUL’s supplier database (1997).  Thus, there might be some false reporting on the part of 
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third of 404 Maruti Udyog Ltd’s. first-tier suppliers were established mostly within the 
NCR, after Maruti Udyog Ltd. started its operations in 1983.20  With Maruti Udyog 
Ltd.’s remarkable growth (see Figure 1), which led to the rapid growth of the 
component industry, many second-tier suppliers have also proliferated in the same city 
as their customers (i.e., Maruti Udyog Ltd.’s first-tier suppliers).  In other words, the 
NCR auto cluster emerged rapidly as Maruti Udyog Ltd. grew, mainly through Maruti 
Udyog Ltd.’s development of local suppliers.   
 
Table 5: Geographic Distribution of MUL's First-tier Suppliers 
Geographical Distribution: # of Firms % Distribution
Firm Size: 
  
City State     Large Medium Small 
Faridabad  * Haryana 77 19.1 12 36 29 
New Delhi * Delhi 71 17.6 29 22 20 
Gurgaon * Haryana 63 15.6 17 19 27 
Chennai Tamil Nadu 28 6.9 17 4 7 
Mumbai Maharashtra 23 5.7 11 4 8 
NOIDA * U.P. 16 4.0 5 2 9 
Pune Maharashtra 16 4.0 10 6 0 
Bangalore Karnataka 15 3.7 7 7 1 
Coimbatore Tamil Nadu 8 2.0 4 3 1 
Old Delhi * Delhi 7 1.7 3 2 2 
                                                                                                                                               
suppliers to indicate their loyalty to MUL. The actual dependency might be thus lower. 
20 Data are from MUL’s supplier database (1997). 
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Ludhiana Punjab 6 1.5 2 4 0 
Ghaziabad * U.P. 6 1.5 1 2 3 
Calcutta West Bengal 5 1.2 4 1 0 
Other Locations  63 15.6 32 23 8 
Total   404 100 154 135 115 
Notes: * refers to locations within the NCR.  The data are based on MUL’s supplier database as of January 1997.   
Source: MUL’s internal documents (1997). 
 
 Several factors explain Maruti Udyog Ltd’s massive investment in its elaborate 
program of vendor development, involving stable and close supplier relations with its 
first-tier suppliers, equity participation in key suppliers, and promotion of technical 
collaboration between its suppliers with Suzuki’s suppliers in Japan.  First, the 
government’s phased manufacturing program (PMP) mandated foreign firms to promote 
localization.  Suzuki’s MOU with its joint-venture partner, the Indian government, 
included its commitment to achieve 50% local content within the first three years, and 
70% by the fifth year (Okada 2000).  Maruti Udyog Ltd.’s initial focus on domestic 
markets rather than on exports, allowed it to compromise on the quality of the 
component products produced by local suppliers, which it could not afford if it were 
exporting its products.  Second, the appreciation of the yen in the early 1980s, along 
with the high customs duty imposed on CKD (complete knock-down) (110% until 
1991), made imported components from Japan extremely expensive. Maruti Udyog Ltd. 
knew that if it used CKD imports, it could not compete with other domestic producers.21  
                                                 
21 The price of CKD was determined in US dollars, and thus the exchange rate between the US dollar and the 
Japanese yen significantly affected the cost of production (talk by Mr. R.C. Bhargava, former CEO of MUL, at 
Harvard University, February 1998). 
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Faced with the dilemma posed by the poor quality of locally-produced components on 
the one hand and the need to increase the local content on the other, Maruti Udyog Ltd. 
had no choice but to heavily invest in the development of the capabilities of its suppliers 
(Okada 2000).  The development of suppliers has been particularly important for 
Maruti Udyog Ltd., given its high reliance on outsourcing which accounts for 80 
percent of the value of a car, even higher than the level of outsourcing in Japan (70 
percent).22 
 Third, Maruti Udyog Ltd. was the first firm to introduce a partial ‘just in time’ 
(JIT) system in India. This required Maruti Udyog Ltd. to source the dependable quality 
of component products, so as to be loaded without detailed on-site inspection and 
quality testing by Maruti Udyog Ltd. after their delivery, and it also required suppliers 
to be located near the car assembly plant, to allow frequent and on-time delivery.  
However, for most parts (where the units were not located near the Maruti Udyog Ltd. 
complex, Maruti Udyog Ltd. had to hold a week’s stock at any time (Hattori 1996), 
Maruti Udyog Ltd. has a double sourcing strategy, due to the generally poor 
infrastructure (roads, electricity, and telecommunication), which often hampers on-time 
delivery, making it costly to rely on a single source for each component, and therefore 
making it difficult to fully adopt the JIT principle.23   
 Fourth, on a related point, while Maruti Udyog Ltd. had also sourced parts 
from a few large suppliers from the southern States such as Tamil Nadu, these suppliers,  
particularly those of bulky and heavy components, were motivated to establish new 
                                                 
22 Fujimoto and Takeishi (1994) for the figure on Japan. 
23 In fact, Japanese managers think that the Indian automobile industry, including MUL, is still far from operating 
under the JIT principle (interviews with senior managers of MUL, Denso India, and the CEO of Toyota India Corp.).   
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plants close to their customers.  This is partly both because of the increased awareness 
among first-tier suppliers of the importance of on-time delivery through the adoption of 
some elements of the JIT inventory system that Maruti Udyog Ltd. introduced, and 
because of an interest in reducing transport costs, including the payment of the octroi, 
which tax each State government levies on the consignments each time they cross the 
State border. Thus, given the intensified competition among component manufacturers, 
firms outside the NCR, such as Chennai-based Lucas-TVS, have also set up a plant near 
Maruti Udyog Ltd.’s plant.  Indeed, with the introduction of the JIT concept, which 
aims to reduce assemblers’ inventory costs, some first-tier suppliers with multiple 
customers started setting up new plants near their customers in different regions to cater 
to each of them.  While this helps assemblers reduce their inventory costs, however, it 
also places some constraints on the suppliers, as they have to manage and finance 
simultaneous expansions in widely dispersed locations (Humphrey et al. 1998). 
 Fifth, many local small firms that could serve as ancillaries had already existed 
prior to Maruti Udyog Ltd.’s entry, although their technological levels were not 
compatible with Maruti Udyog Ltd.’s standards.  Government policy since the 1960s 
aimed to protect and promote the Small Scale Industries (SSI), by providing various 
incentives, such as the allocation of plots in industrial estates at subsidized costs, 
electricity, and telephone connections, and by reserving many auto components to be 
produced only by the SSI sector (Okada 2000).  This reservation policy forced auto 
manufacturers to buy rather than make these items.24  Maruti Udyog Ltd.’s growth has 
                                                 
24 As of 1997, more than 64 auto components were reserved to be produced by the SSI sector. Even after 
liberalization in 1991, the reservation policy for SSI continued, with only 7 items removed from the list by 1994 
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also encouraged many small-scale entrepreneurs to start business in close locations, 
taking advantage of such incentives provided to the SSI firms.  Thus, about 60 percent 
of Maruti Udyog Ltd.’s 404 first-tier suppliers are small and medium enterprises (see 
Table 5).    
 Finally, Maruti Udyog Ltd.’s close collaboration with the government has 
facilitated the development of Maruti Udyog Ltd.’s local supplier base.  The central 
government, the firm’s joint venture partner, has protected and promoted Maruti Udyog 
Ltd. through various policy measures and concessions.  Moreover, while being a joint 
venture partner, the central government did not politically interfere with Maruti Udyog 
Ltd.’s functioning, which was unusual in India.  Likewise, the state government of 
Haryana also supported Maruti Udyog Ltd. in many ways.  For example, in 1997, 
Maruti Udyog Ltd. set up a new supplier park close to its main plant in Gurgaon as a 
joint venture between Maruti Udyog Ltd. and the Haryana State Industrial Development 
Corporation (HSIDC) as part of the industrial model township developed by HSIDC, to 
house Maruti Udyog Ltd.’s 65 first-tier suppliers which produce essential and critical 
components for Maruti Udyog Ltd. cars, and to ensure an unhindered supply of these 
components.  The cost of development of this industrial park, at nearly Rs. 100 crore 
(or approx. US $30 million), was shared between Maruti Udyog Ltd. and HSIDC.  A 
tripartite plant-level committee comprising representatives from Maruti Udyog Ltd., the 
government, and HSIDC oversaw the processes of planning and implementation of this 
project.     
                                                                                                                                               
(Okada 2000).  
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 Maruti Udyog Ltd. has maintained a long-term close relationship with suppliers, 
based on reciprocal interactions, with a greater emphasis on quality and on-time 
delivery, and also provided the designs and drawings to them.  Maruti Udyog Ltd.’s 
heavy investment in supplier development was rather unusual in India, because prior to 
Maruti Udyog Ltd.’s entry, during the inward-looking trade and industrial regime until 
the mid-1980s, a small production volume and absence of competition gave auto 
assemblers few incentives to strengthen the capabilities of their suppliers.  Maruti 
Udyog Ltd. not only sent their shop floor employees to Japan for training but also 
encouraged their suppliers to follow its example (Okada 2004 for more detailed 
discussions).  These practices have also contributed to the development of the NCR 
cluster. 
 As Table 6 shows, Maruti Udyog Ltd.’s remarkable contributions to the 
development of the NCR cluster through its supplier development is in part exemplified 
by the very high labor productivity of the auto sector in Haryana, which is nearly double 
that of the national average and the second highest among all the states after 
Maharashtra.      
 
Table 6:  Regional Disparity in Wages and Value Added per Worker 
in the Transport Equipment and Parts Sector, 1993-94 : Selected States 
States No. of 
Factories 
No. of 
Workers 
Annual 
Wages per 
Production 
Worker 
(US$) 
Wage Index 
(All 
India=100)
Net Value 
Added Per 
Worker 
(US$) 
Net Value 
Added Per 
Worker 
Index (All 
India=100)
All India 4,180    374,852 1,248 100 4,149 100
Bihar       125      27,223 1,428 114 3,018 73
Gujarat       250      15,983        672 54 2,630 63
Haryana       220      23,314 1,140 91 8,106 195
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Karnataka       190      16,609 1,536 123 4,638 112
Maharashtra       767      55,762 2,112 168 8,275 199
Punjab       772      37,892        792 63 2,440 59
Tamil Nadu       548      65,625 1,164 93 3,991 96
Uttar Pradesh       305      32,995 1,104 88 3,253 78
West Bengal       215      59,608 1,080 86 1,944 47
Delhi       381       8,201 1,152 92 2,819 68
Notes:  1)  Workers refer to all persons directly engaged in any manufacturing process, and do not 
include indirect workers or administrative and managerial staff.  
2) The exchange rate is US $1 = 30.71 for 1993-94.  
3) The total numbers of factories (4,180) and of workers (374,852) do not agree with the estimates 
provided by ACMA.  This is partly because the factories covered in these statistics are only those 
registered with the government and do not include informal sector firms. 
Sources: Okada (2000) (Constructed and calculated from Government of India, Central Statistical 
Organization, 1996. Annual Survey of Industries 1993-94:  Summary Results for Factory Sector: Table 
6-13). 
 
 In addition to Maruti Udyog Ltd., however, a couple of other assemblers are 
also located in the NCR, although their influence on the development of the NCR 
cluster has been much smaller than that of Maruti Udyog Ltd.: One is Daewoo Motors 
India, Ltd., and the other is Honda Siel Cars India, Ltd.  Daewoo failed mainly because 
its parent company in Korea failed.  Daewoo Motors India entered into a joint venture 
with Daewoo in 1994.25  The collaborator, Daewoo Corporation, held 91.6% equity in 
the joint venture.  One of the main features of the joint venture is that the 
manufacturing and marketing activities of the Toyota Dyna range of light commercial 
vehicles were not discontinued.  The firm launched the Cielo model in July 1995, and 
its upgraded version in 1996.  It created its production facilities at Surajpur, UP., with 
a capacity to produce 70,000 passenger cars per annum.  The firm produced a total of a 
                                                 
25 The firm was originally set up in 1983 as a part of the DCM group in collaboration with Toyota Motor 
Corporation, under the name DCM Toyota.  The firm’s Toyota range of commercial vehicles failed to meet the 
pricing requirement and the firm was in the red.  Thus, the firm, in consultation with Toyota, started a new joint 
venture with Daewoo, Korea. 
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few thousand cars in India only for a few years.26 
 Honda Siel Cars India is a new unit and it started production only in 2000/01.  
In 2003/04, the firm produced 17,953 mid-size cars, 2,031 premium cars and exported 
27 mid-size cars.  While its sales have been increasing, its operation is still too modest 
to make a considerable contribution to the NCR cluster. 
 
5.4   Chennai and NCR Clusters Compared 
 In several respects Chennai and the NCR auto clusters present interesting 
contrasts.  First, the NCR cluster, by and large, confirms to the traditional pattern – the 
emergence of a lead firm (i.e., Maruti Udyog Ltd.) and its vital role in developing the 
components industry and the gradual development of a cluster. The Chennai cluster, by 
contrast, emerged with the establishment of large component firms like the TVS, Rane 
and the Amalgamations groups that from the beginning targeted the all-India market.  
While Chennai also did have assemblers such as Standard Motors and Ashok Leyland in 
the initial years, their scale of operations was small, and thus the components’ 
manufacturing firms had to target the all-India market due to a small demand for auto 
components within the cluster.  Moreover, the emergence of the auto component 
industry in the 1940s predated the arrival of these assemblers.  As large component 
firms in Chennai had targeted the all-India market from the beginning, the components 
supplied from the cluster had penetration non only across the country, but even in 
another auto cluster, in the Mumbai-Pune belt in Maharashtra.  Later on, only in the 
1990s leading auto manufacturing multinationals like Ford, Hyundai and Hindustan 
                                                 
26 However, its production facility is still intact and local sources suggest that it could be acquired by the Tata 
Motors. 
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(Mitsubishi) came to Chennai, being attracted by the presence of a well-established 
component manufacturing industry.  
 Thus, different factors have influenced the formation of the two clusters.  First, 
Chennai has no assembly firm like Maruti Udyog Ltd. that served as the lead firm to 
form and develop the cluster, whereas in the NCR, Maruti Udyog Ltd. played a 
dominant role.  Second, the presence of seaports was important for the formation of 
the Chennai auto clusters that initially relied on imports of components and materials.  
Third, the NCR, being the national capital, enjoys the closest links with the centers of 
power and patronage.    
 Nevertheless, in some other ways, the NCR cluster shares certain common 
characteristics with the Tamil Nadu cluster.  For example, like Tamil Nadu, the NCR 
enjoys the presence of many engineering education institutions that supply a skilled 
workforce and notches a high score of HDI.   
  
6.  Differential Behavior of Cluster and Non-Cluster firms 
The literature surveyed in Section 2 indicates that firms located in an industrial cluster 
enjoy several advantages like external economies, sharing of knowledge and 
information, technological environment, availability of skilled labor force, infrastructure 
and other environmental supports provided by the government and its agencies. As a 
result of these advantages provided by the cluster, the performance and conduct of the 
firms located in an industrial cluster could differ from those located outside a cluster. In 
the automobile sector, while many firms are located in Chennai, the NCR, and in the 
Mumbai – Pune clusters, there are also firms outside these clusters.  We expect firms 
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located in these three clusters to behave differently from those located outside these 
clusters.  We also expect inter-cluster differences in the performance of the firms 
inside and outside the clusters. Profit margins and productivity are considered as 
performance variables of the firms while advertisement intensity, FDI, exports, 
inventories, royalty and technical fee payments, import of materials and components 
and other foreign payments are taken as representative of conduct variables. The 
conduct variables mainly represent the international orientation variables, technology 
variables and product differentiation variables.   
From the literature survey we identify variables that could discriminate firms in 
different clusters and other firms located outside the clusters. We cover only auto 
component firms and not the leading auto assemblers, as they are only a few auto 
assemblers.  We classify firms into four groups according to their locations: (a) 
Chennai (including firms in surrounding areas in Tamil Nadu); (b) Pune-Mumbai 
(including surrounding areas in Maharashtra); (c) NCR; and (d) Other (other firms 
located outside the three clusters). 
 
6.1  Variables Representing Performance 
 Some studies argue that firms located in a cluster should perform better in 
terms of profits, growth and productivity (Helsley and Strange 2001). If there are 
agglomeration advantages in the sample Indian firms, then these should show in their 
performance.  In this section, we use the following two variables as performance 
indicators, namely, profit margins and labor productivity.  All the variables are at the 
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firm level. The sample consists of component manufacturing firms, but exclude car 
manufacturers as there are only about a dozen car manufacturers in these clusters.  
Profit Margins refers to gross profits as a ratio of sales turnover [(total revenue – total 
cost)/total revenue]. Some studies also use profit rates, namely, gross profits as a ratio 
of capital invested. However, this measure suffers from the well-known problems 
associated with the measurement of capital, appropriateness of the discount rate to be 
used in evaluating the heterogeneous capital stock of different vintages. We expect 
profit margins to be higher among firms that are located in a cluster.  
Labor Productivity refers to productivity of a rupee spent on labor.  We use this 
measure partly due to data constraints and partly due to theoretical considerations. 
Indian firms are not required to disclose the number of employees and consequently the 
balance sheet data does not report employment statistics.  Thus, the denominator of the 
labor productivity variable, namely, the number of workers, is not often available.  
Nevertheless, they report the total emoluments paid to their employees. To overcome 
this problem, Kathuria (2000, 2002), calculates the average wage rates for different 
industries from the publication Annual Survey of Industries, and divides the wage bill of 
the firm by the average wage rate of the corresponding industry to obtain the number of 
workers in the firm. This method of obtaining the number of workers at the firm level has 
the following limitations. Since MNEs pay higher wages compared to the local firms, it 
could overestimate the number of workers in MNEs. Goldar et al. (2004) follow a similar 
method but assume that MNEs pay 10 percent more wages than the local firms. These 
methods also do not take into account the heterogeneity of the workforce and differences 
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in the skill content. Furthermore, several Indian firms, particularly in recent years, have 
been employing workers through labor contractors. The payments made to labor 
contractors come under labor costs but the workers employed through the contractors are 
not on the pay roll of the firm.  Under these circumstances, we suggest that a variable like 
value added per unit cost of labor, that is, value added divided by the sum spent on labor 
would be a more appropriate variable, as in some other studies (Ray 2004, Caves 1992). 
We assume that firms should be more interested in the productivity of the sums they 
spend on labor rather than in an indirect measure of productivity of a representative 
person they employ.  
Conduct Variables 
Advertisement refers to advertisement expenditures as a ratio of sales turnover. We 
have used sales turnover to normalize for the size factor. In other words we use 
advertisement intensity. Since all the sample firms are component manufacturers, we 
expect established firms in prominent clusters having durable (long-term) relationship 
with vehicle manufacturers/assemblers to advertise less as they do not need to look for 
customers.  On the other hand, firms located outside the clusters need to advertise 
more to inform customers and other firms. 
Exports refer to exports to sales ratio, export intensity. In theory, firms located in 
clusters are likely to mainly deal with other cluster firms and are expected to have a 
durable relationship with the vehicle manufacturing firms.  Therefore, they may not 
look actively for the export market.  Hence, we expect firms located outside the 
clusters to export more.   
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FDI refers to the share of foreign promoter’s investment in the total equity capital of the 
firm. The FDI literature surveyed in Section 2 suggests that multinationals might 
gravitate to agglomerations and invest more in clusters.  Nevertheless, our discussion 
on the Chennai cluster shows that the Chennai component manufacturing firms, in 
particular the TVS group and the Rane group went for non-equity strategic alliances 
with multinationals rather than an equity alliance.  Therefore, it is difficult to predict 
the outcome of this variable in differentiating cluster firms from others. 
Inventory refers to inventory to sales ratio. We expect firms in clusters that are 
dominated by multinational vehicle manufacturing firms, like Ashok Leyland, Ford, 
Hyundai and Hindustan Motors (with Mitsubishi involvement) in Chennai, and MUL 
and Honda in NCR, to have lower inventory holdings as these clusters have developed a 
culture of low inventory and JIT delivery systems. Other firms that do not belong to a 
cluster might hold more inventories as they have to ship their products to customers in 
different regions. 
Sales refers to sales turnover as a proxy for the size of the firm.  We expect the cluster 
firms to be of a larger size and enjoy higher turnovers.  
Material Import refers to the import of components and materials as a ratio of sales.  
Firms that supply to multinationals might use more of imported materials as the quality 
standards are likely to be more stringent and India need not produce all the high quality 
materials. As discussed earlier this could also represent embodied technology imports. 
Tech Import refers to the payments of royalty and technology fees as a ratio of sales. 
We expect technology payments to be higher among firms in clusters where the vehicle 
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manufacturing is dominated by large multinationals as they expect the component firms 
to keep pace with new technology.  These imports are referred to as disembodied 
technology imports. 
 The conduct variables are by and large related to technology and globalization. 
Tech Import refers to import of disembodied technology in the form of blue prints or 
licensing fee for patents, etc., against royalty and technology fee payments. Material 
import refers to embodied technology transfer, that is, technology is embodied in the 
inputs imported like components and high tech materials. FDI could be interpreted as 
intra-firm transfer of technology. Likewise, Advertisement could also be interpreted as a 
variable denoting product differentiation, as the literature on multinational enterprises 
uses advertisement expenditures to denote product differentiation (Caves 1996, Lall and 
Siddharthan 1982). The firm differentiates the product through technology acquisition 
and informs the prospective customers through advertisement. 
6.2 Econometric Analysis 
Data Set 
 For empirical analysis we use the Capital Line database, one of the most 
well-cited firm-level databases available in India, providing data for about 8000 firms 
registered in India (this includes multinationals registered in the Indian Stock 
Exchanges). Our sample consists of all the automobile component manufacturing firms 
listed in the Capital Line database, covering the period 1998 – 2005.  However, we 
deleted firms (or observations for certain years) that were producing a very low volume 
of output or showed zero value addition.  This could be due to two reasons: first, these 
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firms could be new and had not yet commenced normal production; for these firms we 
deleted the initial years where the value addition is very low or zero; and second, these 
firms could have stopped production.  We have not used a balanced panel as that does 
not take into account the entry and exit of firms. In the Indian case, it is important to 
take into consideration the entry of new firms as well as the exit of inefficient units.  In 
fact the main objective of the liberalization measures introduced in India in the early 
1990s is to attract new entry and increase competition.  Therefore, we have considered 
an open panel.  
 Table 7 presents the group means and standard deviations of the firms in the 
four groups for the performance and conduct variables.  It does not show the statistical 
significance of the differences between the three groups.  That is presented in Table 8 
where logistic regressions are presented using a multivariate model. Bivariate testing is 
not appropriate as it is important to examine the statistical significance of a variable in 
the presence of the other variables. 
 
Table 7: Group Mean and Standard Deviation of the Four Groups 
 Others Chennai Pune-Mumbai NCR 
Variables Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD
Performance 
Variables 
    
Profit Mar 0.029 
O.501 
0.069 
0.551 
0.584 
5.571 
0.071 
0.146 
Labor Prod 2.484 
1.813 
2.742 
4.468 
2.762 
1.968 
2.936 
1.694 
Conduct 
Variables 
    
Advertisement 0.0070 
0.015 
0.0023 
0.0049 
0.0064 
0.019 
0.0016 
0.0035 
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Exports .1120 
(.172) 
0.0687 
0.123 
0.037 
0.070 
0.051 
0.087 
FDI 11.06 
22.86 
5.319 
12.331 
12.505 
21.214 
10.140 
18.707 
Inventory 0.196 
0.187 
0.152 
0.244 
0.218 
0.630 
0.139 
0.127 
 Sales 97.05 
198.90 
138.108 
152.79 
124.381 
168.996 
134.462 
132.476 
Material 
Import 
0.046 
0.069 
0.077 
0.094 
0.057 
0.173 
0.084 
0.107 
Tech Imports 0.003 
0.0068 
0.0049 
0.009 
0.016 
0.150 
0.0049 
0.0079 
Source: authors 
 
As Table 7 shows, some of the Maharashtra firms appear to be trading-cum- 
manufacturing firms as their gross profits in relation to sales are very high. Therefore, 
we concentrate more on the NCR and Tamil Nadu clusters and other non-cluster firms. 
 The mean values of profit margins are higher for the cluster groups than for the 
‘other’ non-cluster group.  This result is valid even if we ignore the Maharashtra 
cluster.  Whether this result is statistically significant in a multivariate analysis or not 
will be known in the logistic regressions.  The results presented in Table 7 show that 
being part of a cluster positively influences the performance of the firms and they do 
better. Profit margins are more than double that of the non-cluster firms. Furthermore, 
productivity per rupee spent on labor is also higher for the firms located in the three 
clusters compared to the non-cluster firms.  
 With regard to the conduct variables, the table shows that firms in Tamil Nadu 
and the NCR spend much lesser on advertisement (in relation to their sales turnover) 
compared to the firms in the other two groups. This result is also expected as the firms 
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located in Tamil Nadu and the NCR are well-established and reputed firms and enjoy 
multinational clientele.  For them additional returns from extra advertisements is likely 
to be low. On the other hand, the firms in the other two groups are relatively new and 
needs to advertise more to establish themselves in the industry. 
 The non-cluster firms enjoyed higher export intensities compared to the firms 
located in the three clusters. This result is also not unexpected. Firms in the three 
clusters supply mainly to car manufacturing units within the cluster and also to other 
firms located in other clusters.  The non-cluster firms need to go-in for the export 
market to expand their activities.  
 Chennai firms have lower FDI (foreign equity participation) compared to the 
other three groups. We attribute this to historical factors. The main Chennai-based 
business houses were set-up in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  By the time India 
liberalized FDI, the Chennai firms were firmly established and well recognized and 
could attract foreign strategic non-equity alliances and were not forced seek for foreign 
equity participation.  MNE theories suggest that the transaction costs in transferring 
technology are higher when dealing with relatively new firms compared to established 
and reputed firms. The theory further suggests that where transaction costs are high 
MNEs will prefer FDI and not licensing of technology (Dunning 1993, Teece 1977, 
Siddharthan and Safarian 1997). 
 Firms in Chennai and the NCR had a lower inventory to sales ratio compared 
to the other two groups.  This is also anticipated.  The need for low inventories and 
JIT delivery are better appreciated in clusters dominated by vehicle manufacturing 
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multinationals.  The main vehicle manufacturers in the Pune cluster are Indian firms.  
Lower inventories in Chennai and the NCR could be attributed to the spillover effects of 
MNEs. 
 The non-cluster firms are much smaller than the clustered ones.  The average 
size of the Chennai firm is much larger than that of firms in the other three groups; NCR 
comes second followed by Pune and the non-cluster firms come last. The Chennai firms 
discussed in Section 5 catered to the India market, and they supplied components to all 
the major vehicle manufacturers located in different parts of the country, including 
those in the NCR and the Pune-Mumbai clusters. The result confirms our description in 
Section 5.  
 Chennai and NCR clusters import more of materials and make more 
technology payments compared to the other two groups.  It is possible that the firms 
located in these two clusters produce more sophisticated and technology intensive goods 
and therefore need to import high quality materials and frequently upgrade their 
technology through technical fee and royalty payments. It is also possible that the 
leading multinationals like Ford, Hyundai, Hindustan Motors (Mitsubishi) and MUL to 
whom they supply the components require higher standards in terms of technology and 
sophistication.  Low technology payments by component firms in Pune could also be 
due to the dominance of the domestic auto manufacturers, such as Tata Motors that 
extensively carry out in-house technological development of even components 
involving its suppliers.  By and large, Table 7 indicates that with regard to 
performance and conduct variables, the Chennai and NCR clusters display similar 
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trends and that these two clusters are very different from the “other” group of firms that 
do not belong to any cluster.  The firms in the Pune-Mumbai cluster come somewhere 
between the non-cluster firms and those in Chennai and the NCR clusters. The firms in 
Pune-Mumbai cluster mainly supply to Indian vehicle manufacturers and that could 
explain their differential behavior.  
 
6.3  Logistic Model and Multivariate Analysis 
In Tables 8 and 9 in all the equations the dependent variable takes the value of 
either zero or one.  In such cases, Ordinary Least Square estimates are not appropriate 
and therefore logit or probit models are suggested. We have used logit models.27  The 
maximum likelihood estimates of the logit model are presented in Tables 8 and 9. 
                                                 
27 Probit models also yielded similar results. 
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Table 8: Logit Model Results: Maximum Likelihood Estimates   
Inter-Cluster Differences 
 Chennai-NCR Chennai-Pune NCR-Pune 
Equation      1     2     3 
Constant 
Z Stat 
-0.581 
(-1.25) 
-0.886* 
(1.72) 
-0.235 
(-0.41) 
Profit Margin -.430 
(0.999) 
-0.450** 
(-2.30) 
-1.579* 
(-1.72) 
Labour Prod -0.035 
(-0.87) 
-0.050 
(-0.92) 
0.078 
(0.99) 
Advertisement 22.841 
(1.05) 
-68.22*** 
(-4.01) 
-63.25*** 
(-3.47) 
Exports 1.081 
(1.25) 
4.943*** 
(3.27) 
4.347*** 
(2.89) 
FDI -0.020*** 
(3.19) 
-0.033*** 
(-4.57) 
-0.017*** 
(-3.03) 
Inventory 1.006 
(1.26) 
-0.483 
(-0.92) 
-1.040 
(-0.84) 
L Sales 0.099 
(1.08) 
0.325*** 
(3.06) 
0.116 
(1.08) 
Material Import -0.488 
(-0.52) 
8.787*** 
(4.27) 
9.278*** 
(4.70) 
Tech Imports 11.700 
(1.03) 
-10.697 
(-0.79) 
-5.631 
(-0.66) 
LR Stat 20.09*** 94.72*** 83.85*** 
NOBS 541 431 458 
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Table 8 presents results on the inter cluster differences and Table 9 on 
differences between firms that are located inside clusters and those outside the clusters.  
In Table 8, Equation 1, firms located in Chennai take the value 1 and those located in 
the NCR take the value zero. In Equation 2, firms from Chennai take the value 1 and 
those from Pune-Mumbai take the value zero.  In Equation 3, firms inside the NCR 
take the value 1 and firms in the Pune-Mumbai cluster take the value zero.  
 In Table 9, Equation 1, firms in the three clusters (Cls) take the value 1 and the 
other firms outside the three clusters take the value zero. Equations 2 to 4 compares 
firms from each of the three clusters to firms located outside the three clusters. In all the 
equations firms outside the three clusters take the value zero and the firms in the 
respective clusters takes the value one. 
 As seen from LR statistics all the equations in both the tables have good fits 
and they are all significant at the 1 percent level. As anticipated Table 8 shows that 
firms located in Chennai and the NCR behave in a similar fashion.  Except for the FDI 
variable no other variable has emerged significant in the logit analysis. As explained 
earlier the significance of FDI in the equation is due to historical reasons.  Except for 
this single difference, the two clusters appear to be homogeneous. Nevertheless, as seen 
from Table 9, firms located in the two clusters behave differently from the firms located 
outside the clusters. The results of equations 1, 2 and 3 in Table 9 are similar further 
reinforcing the similarity between the Chennai and NCR clusters, and firms located 
outside the clusters. Equations 2 and 3 in Table 6 clearly show that Pune-Mumbai 
cluster behaves differently from the Chennai and NCR clusters. 
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Table 9: Logit Model Results: Maximum Likelihood Estimates  
Cluster and Non-Cluster Differences 
 Cls-Other Chennai-Other NCR-Other Pune-Other 
Equation       1      2      3      4 
Constant 
Z Stat 
-0.104 
(-0.28) 
-2.025*** 
(-3.89) 
-0.512 
(-0.96) 
-0.464 
-0.84 
Profit Margin -0.037 
(-0.35) 
-0.680 
(-1.49) 
-0.626 
(-0.91) 
0.754** 
(1.96) 
Labor Prod -0.010 
(-0.34) 
-0.021 
(-0.44) 
0.034 
(0.44)) 
-0.051 
(-0.71) 
Advertisement -30.35*** 
(-4.22) 
-93.09*** 
(-4.78) 
-93.15*** 
(-4.37) 
-4.621 
(-0.68) 
Exports -3.604*** 
(-5.88) 
-2.399*** 
(-3.04) 
-3.352*** 
(-3.90) 
-6.194*** 
(-4.54) 
FDI -0.012*** 
(2.91) 
-0.037*** 
(-4.72) 
-0.015*** 
(-2.47) 
0.004 
(0.78) 
Inventory -0.362 
(-0.84) 
-0.778 
(-0.86) 
-2.385*** 
(-2.42) 
-1.846* 
(-1.67) 
L Sales 0.370*** 
(4.69) 
0.636*** 
(5.66) 
0.297*** 
(2.81) 
0.191** 
(1.89) 
Material 
Import 
4.870*** 
(3.75) 
7.923*** 
(4.41) 
7.426*** 
(4.54) 
1.329 
(0.60) 
Tech Imports 20.885* 
(1.81) 
31.867* 
(1.65) 
27.666* 
(1.70) 
26.622** 
(1.88) 
LR Stat 118.45*** 128.64*** 134.44*** 58.25*** 
NOBS 946 489 516 406 
 
 In Table 9, the performance variables, namely, profit margins and productivity 
have not emerged as significant in differentiating firms belonging to the three clusters 
from those located outside the clusters in the presence of the conduct variables. It is 
quite possible that firms located in these two clusters (Chennai and the NCR) enjoyed 
higher performance indicators mainly because of their conduct variables and when they 
are introduced directly, the performance variables turn out to be insignificant. Thus, 
Chennai and NCR firms enjoyed better profit margins and productivities mainly 
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because they used better material and constantly upgraded their technology and when 
these two variables were used in the equation along with the performance variables, the 
performance variables loose their significance. 
 Equations 2 and 3 in Table 9 show that firms located in Chennai and the NCR 
clusters spend much less on advertisements compared to the firms that are not part of 
the three clusters. This, as mentioned earlier while discussing Table 7, is as anticipated. 
Furthermore, Chennai and the NCR firms also spend much less than the firms located in 
Pune-Mumbai on advertisements. Besides, firms in these two clusters also export less 
compared to the firms located in Pune-Mumbai and non-cluster firms. These two 
variables, namely, advertisement intensity and export intensity are significant in all the 
relevant equations at the 1 percent level. Likewise, FDI is also significant in all the 
equations except equation 4. Inventory sales ratio is significant only in equation 3, 
indicating firms in the NCR hold less inventory compared to the non-cluster firm. In 
Table 7, Chennai firms also held less inventories but it has not emerged important in the 
multivariate analysis. The average size of the firm as represented by log sales has 
emerged significant at the 1 percent level in all the three (equations 2, 3 & 4) that 
differentiate the non-cluster firms from the three respective clusters. Thus the larger size 
of the firms located in the three clusters observed in Table 7 has emerged significant in 
Table 9. Table 9 further shows that Chennai and the NCR firms are more import (import 
of components and materials) intensive than are the other two groups.  This variable is 
also significant at the 1 percent level. However, when it comes to technology imports, it 
is significant at only the 10 percent level.  In other words, Table 9 by and large, 
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confirms all the findings of Table 7, except for the performance variables.  
 In sum, firms located in Chennai and the NCR clusters behave alike with 
respect to the performance and conduct variables considered in the study.  Further, 
firms in these two clusters behave very differently from those located outside the three 
clusters. The behavior of the firms located in Pune-Mumbai lies somewhat in-between 
these two.  
 
7. Conclusion and Main Lessons of the Study 
Indian industrial clusters exhibits some interesting patterns of cluster formation.  We 
find that industrial clusters are largely concentrated in three regions, namely, Chennai 
(Tamil Nadu), Pune-Mumbai (Maharashtra), and the national capital region (NCR), 
across different manufacturing sectors, although in addition to them, Hyderabad 
(including its surrounding cities) in Andhra Pradesh has a cluster of the pharmaceutical 
industry.  All these clusters are multi-industry clusters and their continued growth 
supports Jacobs (1969) emphasis on urban diversity in contrast to urban specialization.  
 Our study of the auto clusters in Chennai and the NCR found interesting 
differences in the patterns of formation in these clusters.  The formation of the Chennai 
cluster was mainly driven by large component manufacturers in the late 1940s and the 
1950s, many of whom were member firms of large Indian business houses.  
Agglomeration of auto component manufacturers occurred largely because of the access 
to seaports, and access to a pool of educated workforce, and the strong leadership of the 
State government who actively promoted the industry in the region.  Access to 
seaports was critical in its initial years, due to the industry’s heavy reliance on imported 
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materials and parts.  Thus, the pattern of development of Chennai cluster considerably 
differs from the “flowchart model” presented by Kuchiki (2004), wherein the creation 
of industrial parks and zones attract anchor firms to locate first, and as the cluster 
develops its capacity in terms of human, physical and institutional infrastructures, 
anchor firms in turn play a central role in bringing related firms into the cluster (Kuchiki 
2004).   
 While conforming to his capacity building argument, Chennai’s experience 
considerably differs from Kuchiki’s model with respect to the role of the anchor firms.  
The component manufacturing firms that came first in the late 1940s did not heavily 
depend on the two vehicle manufacturers that existed in the cluster in their initial years. 
From inception, the component manufacturers had targeted the all-India market, due to 
a small volume of production in the industry as a whole.  Thus, due to their small 
production volume, these two vehicle assemblers played very limited roles in 
developing the cluster.  The key component manufacturers also avoided joint ventures 
and FDI participation in the subsequent years because of the Indian government’s 
policy that restricted FDI until the mid-1980s.  Thus, key anchor firms in the Chennai 
auto cluster have been mainly component manufacturers that were established in the 
1960s, rather than assemblers.  Thus, this component manufacturers-led formation of 
the Chennai cluster is quite unique, compared to other auto clusters in India or 
elsewhere.  Assembler firms started playing leading roles in cluster development only 
in the late 1990s, when global players such as Hyundai, Ford, and Mitsubishi came to 
Chennai to start their production. 
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 By contrast, the auto cluster in the NCR was mainly created by a single 
assembler firm, MUL, as an anchor firm, and thus, the pattern of this cluster, by and 
large, confirms Kuchiki’s (2004) flow chart model.  The related firms, in terms of auto 
component manufacturers were actively developed by the anchor firm.  MUL was 
motivated to actively develop its first-tier suppliers by various policy factors, such as 
the requirement to increase local content, mandated by the Indian government; high 
duties on imported parts; and the reservation of various items for production by the 
domestic small-scale firms.  Moreover, being the national capital, the NCR enjoys the 
closest links with the centers of power and patronage, which has favored MUL, the 
central government being a joint venture partner.  The contrasts of the Chennai and 
NCR clusters, therefore, suggests that the presence of inter-cluster variations in the 
patterns of the formation even within the same industry, and that such inter-cluster 
variations are partly explained by the historical and policy conditions under which firms, 
particularly, the lead firms must operate.      
 On the other hand, the two clusters share some common features, such as the 
creation of industrial zones and the availability of high levels of human skills in these 
clusters.  In both clusters, the state government actively intervened in the creation of 
industrial estates, which helped many small firms to locate in the clusters, and the 
development of infrastructure.     
 The study also brings to light certain other aspects such as the role of the state, 
namely, industrial licensing and location policies, and the role of political leaders in 
influencing industrial location.  Until 1991, industrial location was not a free choice of 
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firms guided by commercial consideration.  Industrial licensing policy decided on the 
State where a particular industry would be located, and within the State, the State 
government influenced the exact location. 
 Furthermore, the study reveals the interdependence of and interrelationships 
between industries located in a cluster.  In Chennai, IT firms located in the cluster have 
helped the small and medium automotive firms become globally competitive. Thus, 
multi-industry clusters have an advantage.   
 The econometric analyses carried out in this study confirmed that being part of 
a cluster positively influences the performance of the auto component firms and those 
belonging to a cluster perform better.  Results of the analyses showed that productivity 
per rupee spent on labor is also higher for the firms located in the three clusters than in 
the non-clustered firms, and that the non-clustered firms have a higher export intensity 
than that of firms located in the three clusters.  They also reveal that both the 
performance and behaviors of clustered firms largely differ from non-clustered firms 
and that both firms that are located in Chennai and those in the NCR clusters are similar 
in terms of these performance and conduct variables.  On the other hand, firms in the 
Pune-Mumbai cluster behave differently from those in Chennai and the NCR clusters.   
 However, the performance variables, i.e., profit margins and productivity did 
not differentiate firms belonging to the three clusters from those located outside the 
clusters in the presence of conduct variables.  But, Chennai and the NCR firms enjoy 
better profit margins and productivity, mainly because they used better material and 
constantly upgraded their technologies.  Moreover, firms in Chennai and the NCR 
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spend much less on advertisement than those outside these three clusters.  Besides, 
firms in these two clusters also export less than firms in the Pune-Mumbai cluster and 
those outside clusters.  Our analyses also show that the firms in the NCR cluster hold 
less inventories than in the non-cluster firms.  They also found that Chennai and NCR 
firms are more import (import of components and materials) intensive than the other 
two groups.  These analyzes clearly suggest the advantage of clustered firms over the 
non-clustered ones.  The behaviors and performance of the Chennai and NCR clusters 
are somewhat alike. 
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